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This dissertation study strategically simple mechanisms for problems of multi-
dimensional allocation. Strategic simplicity is crucial to make mechanisms robust
to avoid mistakes and manipulation. However, the current literature on the analysis
and implementation of strategically simple mechanisms is limited, especially for
markets with many goods and services. This dissertation fills this gap with three
complementary but stand-alone chapters. In Chapter 1, we identify and formalize
the criteria for strategic simplicity. Then we combine those criteria into a new
solution concept and propose a new class of mechanism that satisfies these criteria.
In Chapter 2, we analyze the cost of enforcing this new notion of simplicity. In
Chapter 3, we show that the new mechanism is a good candidate in an application
with substantial welfare implications.
The solution concept we propose in Chapter 1 is called obvious regret-proofness
(ORP). It describes conditions that regulate both the extensive form of a dynamic
game and the communication between the auctioneer and the bidders. Those con-
ditions make sure that there is a simple rule for bidders to determine his best action
each time he is called to play. Also, it is easy for the bidder to understand and to ver-
ify that he will not regret choosing this action because the optimality of this action
does not depend on the choices of other bidders. We then translate those require-
ments into auction rules and propose a new class of mechanisms called Persistent
Exit Descending (PED) mechanisms.
Then in Chapter 2, we analyze the cost of pursuing strategic simplicity by
implementing the PED mechanism. We first show that for an efficient strategy-
proof mechanism, the allocation and payment to a bidder can be dependent on
the reports of other bidders. This influence is monotonic and mutual. Therefore,
the externality of a bidder’s choice can be internalized. In contrast, the influence
in PED implementable mechanisms is restricted once the reports of other bidders
exceed some certain thresholds. Moreover, the influence can only be one-sided, which
means that if a bidder has influence over the other bidder, only if that bidder cannot
influence him. Lacking the channel to influence, the decision of a bidder cannot take
into account his externality to other bidders. This is the primary source of welfare
loss in a PED mechanism.
In Chapter 3, we show that the PED mechanism proposed in Chapter 1 is
a good candidate for land assembly problems. It has the properties that most of
the land assembly mechanisms in the literature fail to have, but are fundamental
to land assembly problems. First, it is strategically simple. Second, its allocation
rule is combinatorial. Third, it can assign non-monetary compensations to a bidder.
Finally, it fully respects the owners’ property rights, and it is ex-post individual ra-
tional. We then tailor the PED mechanism to the land assembly problem and apply
the analytical framework from Chapter 2 to discuss the advantages and limitations
of using the PED mechanism in land assembly problems.
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Chapter 1: Multi-dimensional Obviously Regret-Proof Mechanism
1.1 Introduction
Strategic simplicity is an important design goal for centralized market mech-
anisms. If the equilibrium of a mechanism is difficult for bidders to find or to
verify, then the mechanism is prone to bidders’ strategic mistakes, espionage, and
manipulations. If these things happen, then the intended allocation rule cannot be
implemented. Also, because figuring out the optimal strategy is difficult, participat-
ing in this kind of auction becomes burdensome for bidders. Even strategy-proofness
might not be sufficient for strategic simplicity. Because the dominant strategy may
not be easy for the bidders to understand or to verify. Moreover, profitable de-
viations can still exist in strategy-proof mechanisms. To characterize strategically
simple mechanisms, Li (2017) propose a dominant strategy solution concept called
Obviously Strategy-proofness (OSP). It formalizes the condition that the optimality
of the dominant strategy is easy to verify in the extensive form. A strategy Si is
said to be obviously dominant for bidder i, if for all information set Ii which Si
visits, the best-case payoff of any deviation starting from Ii is no better than the
worst-case payoff of following Si. A mechanism is said to be OSP if every type of
bidder has an obviously dominant strategy. Compared to a weakly dominant strat-
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egy, the optimality of an obviously dominant strategy is easier to verify because
bidders only need to compute the outcomes in the best and the worst cases, instead
of in all possible contingencies. Li then shows that mechanisms that are OSP are
also weakly group strategy-proof (WGSP), which means that there are no group
deviations where every member in the group is strictly better off.
Even though OSP appears to be a good criterion for strategic simplicity, this
solution concept is still subject to several limitations. First, the OSP implemen-
tation of a multi-dimensional allocation problem does not exist in the literature.
Even though the solution concept is defined for mechanisms with arbitrary out-
come space. However, at the time this paper is written, OSP implementation ex-
ists only for allocation problems with unit-demand (like the English Auction; Li
(2017)) unit-supply (Milgrom and Segal, 2020), and allocation problems without
payments (Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017). These are restricted classes of allocation
problems, as many applications in market design require the auctioneer to allocate
multi-dimensional and multi-unit goods and services. Second, the definition of OSP
does not regulate all essential aspects of strategic simplicity. Thus, even if the one-
dimensional OSP implementation is indeed simple for bidders, it is not guaranteed
that all the elements of simplicity can be extended to multi-dimensional and more
complex allocation problems. For example, to verify that a strategy is obviously
dominant, bidders need to compute the best-case and worst-case payoffs, but the
simplicity of solving those payoffs is not guaranteed in the definition of OSP. Next,
even if it were easy to verify the optimality of a given strategy, that does not neces-
sarily imply that the strategy itself is easy to find and to execute. Notice that in the
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definition of obviously dominant strategy, the optimality of a given action becomes
obvious only when the bidder knows what to do in all future contingencies. Thus, if
there exist OSP mechanisms for multi-dimensional allocation problems, it is unclear
whether it would be strategically simple for bidders.
In this paper, we identify and formalize the elements that make the one-
dimensional OSP mechanisms simple but are missing from the definition of OSP.
Then we extend those concepts to multi-dimensional mechanisms and propose a new
criterion for strategic simplicity by integrating all these elements. In short, the crite-
rion requires that there exists a simple rule for a bidder to choose the optimal action
each time he or she is called to play. Also, the auction rules and the information
revealed to the bidder should make it easy to verify that he/she will not regret choos-
ing this action regardless of what other bidders do. We call this criterion obviously
regret-proof (ORP) and show that it is a refinement of OSP. Next, we show that the
ORP mechanism can be implemented for multi-dimensional problems by proposing a
new mechanism called the Persistent Exit Descending (PED) mechanism. We show
that the PED mechanism is a multi-dimensional generalization of the English Auc-
tion and the personal clock auction in Milgrom and Segal (2020). Finally, we show
that a mechanism is ORP if and only if it is a PED mechanism and that all well-
behaved OSP-implementable direct mechanisms can be PED-implemented. That is,
enforcing stricter requirements of strategic simplicity does not lose the generality of
a mechanism.
We also develop the necessary and sufficient conditions for a multi-dimensional
mechanism to be OSP. We will see that those conditions are technical. Also, showing
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that the cautiously optimistic strategy is obviously dominant for an arbitrary OSP
mechanism is tedious. The technicality echoes the critique that multi-dimensional
OSP mechanisms are not guaranteed to be strategically simple. Nevertheless, the
necessary and sufficient conditions provide the theoretical foundation for the results
mentioned above. For logical order, this theoretical foundation should come first,
but for the readability of the paper, we move these results to the last section of this
paper. Therefore, nearly all the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Before we dive into the results, let us look at some applications where the
dimensionality of the strategically simple mechanisms has substantial welfare im-
plications. The first application is the land assembly problem, which is the main
topic for Chapter 3. In a land assembly problem, one or more developers try to
acquire multiple contiguous parcels of land from different owners for redevelopment.
It is usually costly and time-consuming to make a deal for this kind of transaction
in decentralized bargaining. That is because the complementarity among adjacent
owners provides them incentives to delay entering the negotiation so they can receive
a higher surplus. This is known in the literature as the holdout problem. In that
case, implementing a centralized mechanism is a good way to avoid a costly back-
and-forth bargaining process. However, since the most of the target participants in
this mechanism are small homeowners with little experience with game theory and
auctions, if the mechanism is too difficult and burdensome, they would not have an
incentive to participate at all. Therefore, strategic simplicity is a very important
design goal for this allocation problem.
Another important design goal is to allow non-monetary compensation to the
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participating bidders, which implies the allocation rule should be multi-dimensional.
At the time this paper is written, most of the market design solutions for land assem-
bly treat the problem as a purely monetary transaction—the mechanism determines
whether they sell their land, and if they do, the monetary compensation they re-
ceive. However, it is very common in the practice that owners are offered newly
built apartments as non-monetary compensation. Another type of non-monetary
compensation is to assign one of the existing apartments as the replacement home,
provided that the owner of that apartment agrees to sell. If the preference of bid-
ders is diverse enough, there would be some bidders who are willing to trade only if
they are offered such non-monetary compensations. Thus, mechanisms with diverse
types of compensation expand the possibilities of transactions and hence increases
the probability of trade and the expected surplus. However, allowing non-monetary
compensation to a bidder implies that more goods would be allocated to this bidder.
Thus, the allocation problem becomes multi-dimensional and incompatible with the
OSP mechanisms that exist in the current literature. In Chapter 3, we will get into
detail how the PED mechanism developed in this chapter can be adapted to the
land assembly problem why the PED mechanism is particularly desirable for this
application.
Another application is the FCC Incentive Auction, where the unit-supply OSP
design was eventually discarded in favor of the one that can implement a multi-
dimensional allocation rule. The FCC Incentive Auction is structurally parallel to
the land assembly problem. It assembles geographically and spectrally contiguous
TV radio stations as opposed to geographically contiguous parcels of land in a land
5
assembly. The assembled spectrum will then be repurposed and auctioned off to
telecommunication companies. The personal clock mechanism (Milgrom and Segal,
2020) that we mentioned earlier was actually proposed for this application. However,
what was modeled in Milgrom and Segal (2020) is a simplified problem, with only
bidders that own a single UHF station. In that case, the allocation problem can
be reduced to a unit-supply problem. However, in the full model, bidders may
have multiple and different types of stations, i.e. UHF and VHF ones. Also, the
FCC needed an allocation rule that could move bidders on a UHF band to a VHF
band, provided that the VHF station owner clears his station. Again, this type
of allocation rule is multi-dimensional and thus not compatible with the design in
Milgrom and Segal (2020). Therefore, the OSP personal clock mechanism was not
adopted in the real auction that was held in 2017.
From the these applications, we know that multi-dimensional strategically
simple mechanisms are needed in real life and have substantial welfare implica-
tions. Thus, it is important for market designers to know how to implement multi-
dimensional strategically simple mechanisms and make sure that they are indeed
simple. That is the reason for us to characterize the elements of strategic simplicity
and to propose the mechanism that implements these elements.
We need to make it clear that strategic simplicity for bidders does not im-
ply computational simplicity for the auctioneer. For a PED mechanism, it can be
computationally difficult for the auctioneer to find the optimal, feasible, and bud-
get balanced descending policy. This is because the nature of choosing a descending
policy is a dynamic decision process, where the state space explodes with the dimen-
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sionality of the problem. That means that, the computation of the PED mechanism
becomes more difficult as the number of bidders and the dimensionality of their
allocation spaces get large. This is called the Curse of Dimensionality in the liter-
ature of dynamic decision making. For that kind of problem, there might still be
numerical methods that can approximate the optimal solution. However, that is
outside the scope of this paper. Therefore, we only introduce the auction rules and
requirements for PED mechanisms in this paper. We will leave the topics about
optimization and computation for future research.
As for the organization of this paper, Section 1.2 introduces the model that
formalizes the multi-dimension and multi-unit allocation problem. We also restate
the definitions of the obviously dominant strategy and the OSP mechanism. Sec-
tion 1.3 identifies and formalizes the elements of strategic simplicity, and it proposes
the new solution concept of an obviously regret-proof mechanism. Section 1.4 in-
troduces the generic ORP implementation, the Persistent Exit Descending (PED)
mechanism, and contrasts it with one-dimensional OSP mechanisms. Finally, in
Section 1.5, we state the necessary and sufficient condition for mechanisms to be
OSP, which is the theoretical building block of this paper.
1.2 The Model
We consider an allocation problem between a non-strategic bidder and a finite
set of strategic bidders, N . The client is the agent who hires the auctioneer to host
the mechanism. He offers to each bidder i ∈ N an individualized allocation space
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Yi ⊆ RKi for some Ki ∈ N. An allocation yi = (yi1, yi2, . . . , yiKi) ∈ Yi specifies
a Ki dimensional vector of goods and services assigned to bidder i. Let y
0
i ∈ Yi
denote the endowment allocation of bidder i. An outcome of a mechanism is a pair
xi = (yi, pi), which specifies an allocation yi ∈ Yi and a payment pi ∈ R from the
client to bidder i. The payment pi can take negative values, which means bidder i
makes a net payment of |pi| to the client. Let Xi ≡ Yi×R be the outcome space for
bidder i ∈ N . We assume that each bidder has a weakly convex, weakly increasing,
continuous preference on Xi that is quasi-linear in payment pi. Let Ui be the set of
utility functions that represent those preferences such that the endowment outcome
is normalized to zero, that is, ui(x
0
i ) = ui(y
0
i , 0). Let YN ≡ Πi∈NYi andXN ≡ Πi∈NXi
be the set of all allocation profiles and outcomes, respectively. The client specifies
a subset of allocation profiles F ⊆ YN that are feasible, and his willingness to pay
w(yN) ∈ R for each feasible allocation profile yN ∈ F . We assume that the client
is budget-constrained to pay at most w(yN) for each yN ∈ F . Given an outcome
profile xN = (yN , pN), the total payment the client must pay is
∑
i∈N pi. Thus, the
payoff for the client is w(yN)−
∑
i∈N pi. A market is then a tuple that summarizes
all the above elements, Ω = 〈N,XN ,UN ,F , w〉.
1.2.1 Examples
Our multi-dimensional multi-quantity allocation model is general enough to
represent a large class of market design problems. In particular, we show by example
that the allocation problem modeled in this paper is a superset of one in Milgrom
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and Segal (2020).
Example 1 (Single Object English Auction) We can model the allocation prob-
lem for the English Auction as follows. The client is the seller. He has one object
to sell. Let N = {1, 2, 3, . . . } be the set of bidders. Each bidder either gets 1 unit of
the good, yi = 1, or 0 unit, yi = 0. Thus, Yi = {0, 1} ⊆ R. The endowment for each
i is y0i = 0. The allocation profile yN ∈ F if and only if at most one yi = 1. The
outcome for i loses is represented by xi = (y
0
i , 0). If i wins at price pi, the outcome
is xi = (1,−pi). The negative sign indicates that the payment is made from the
bidder to the client (seller). This problem can be OSP implemented by an English
Auction.
Example 2 (The FCC Incentive Auction) We consider a simplified FCC In-
centives Auction. In this example, the client is the Federal Communication Com-
mittee (FCC), who wants to buy radio spectrum from station owners. Suppose that
there are just two station owners, N = {1, 2}. Each of these owners is endowed with
one indivisible station. He can either relinquish his rights to the station to FCC or
keep it. Thus, Yi = {0, 1} ⊆ R, where yi = 0 if and only if he relinquishes his
station. The endowment for each i is y0i = 1. The outcome xi = (0, 100) implies i
sells his spectrum for $100; while xi = (1, 0) implies i keeps his station and receives
no payments. Suppose that the buyer is indifferent between these two stations. The
value of getting either one is w.
This allocation problem can be implemented by a simple personal clock auction.
The auctioneer alternately offers a descending price to each owner starting from w.
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Once called to play, the bidder observes the clock price and chooses either to exit and
keep his spectrum or to continue. The auction concludes when one of the bidders
chooses to exit, and the remaining bidder sells his spectrum at the most recent clock
price; or when both bidders choose to exit at the initial offer at w. As shown in
Milgrom and Segal (2020), this mechanism is OSP.
In these examples, there are only two elements in the allocation set Yi. That is,
a bidder is either allocated a good or not. Li (2017) calls this kind of problem a binary
allocation problem. He also shows that these problems can be OSP-implemented by
the personal clock auction. We can also interpret the binary allocation problem as
the unit-demand or unit-supply allocation problem.
In the following example, we will depart from the unit-demand/supply as-
sumption and see the real generality of this model.
Example 3 (Multi-Objects Forward Auction) Now, we consider that there is
a seller who has 2 indivisible objects to sell. Let K = {k1, k2} be the set of goods.
There are 2 bidders, N = {1, 2}. Because there are 2 goods to be allocated, the
outcome space is now 2 dimensional. Yi = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} ⊆ R, where
yik = 1 if and only if good k ∈ K is assigned to bidder i. The endowment for each i
is y0i = (0, 0). The allocation is feasible, yN ∈ F , if and only if y1 + y2 ≤ (1, 1).
We can see that the allocation space Yi is no longer binary. This type of allocation
problems is outside the scope discussed in the papers of Milgrom and Segal (2020)
and Li (2017).
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Example 4 (The FCC Incentive Auction) Consider a more general version of
Example 2. Suppose that the two previously mentioned stations belong to a type
called UHF stations. Now, there are two more owners, each of them owns a station
of an inferior type, the VHF station. Suppose that the buyer still wants to buy only
one UHF station. However, it is possible that some UHF station owners would be
willing to move to one of the VHF stations for some compensation.
Thus, we can consider multilateral transactions where one of the UHF owners
is paid to move to one of the VHF stations, and the VHF owner is paid to go off the
air. Thus, the buyer still gets the UHF spectrum. This opens a new possibility to
make a deal that clears a UHF spectrum. If the subjective cost for the UHF owner
moving to a VHF station is low, and the VHF owner does not value its station very
much, this kind of transaction may have more surplus than having one of the UHF
bidders selling his spectrum.
For simplicity, we assume that bidder 1 can move only to the station of bidder
3; and bidder 2 can move only to the station of 4. That is, these 4 bidders are
divided into two coalitions, competing for the right to clear the UHF station for
some compensation.
In this example, we simply introduce how to model the allocation problem. We
will revisit this example and show how a PED mechanism can implement this kind
of transaction when we have introduced the PED mechanism in Section 1.4.
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, where bidder 1 and 2 are UHF owners and 3 and 4
are VHF owners. Then for each of the UHF bidders, his allocation space is two-
dimensional, where the first dimension specifies whether he is allocated the UHF
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station, while the second dimension specifies the associated VHF one. Thus, there
are in total three possible allocations, Yi = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)}. Where (0, 0) means
he is not allocated both stations, (1, 0) means he is allocated the UHF one, which is
his endowment, and (0, 1) means that he is moved to the VHF one. The allocation
space for each of the VHF bidders remains to be one-dimensional, Yi = {0, 1}, as
the endowed VHF station is the only good to be allocated.
Consider a multilateral transaction where bidder 1 moves to the VHF station
of bidder 3. Then the outcome for bidder 1 is x1 = (0, 1, p
m
1 ) for some payments
pm1 ≥ 0. The outcome for bidder 3 is x3 = (0, p3) for some p3 ≥ 0. The remaining
bidders then receive their endowment outcomes. This is the kind of transaction that
cannot be fulfilled in the personal clock mechanism in Milgrom and Segal (2020).
1.2.2 The Mechanisms
A direct mechanism on market Ω is a pair of functions M = (αN , ρN) such
that αN : UN → F and ρN : UN → R|N |. A dynamic mechanism on market Ω is
an extensive form game where each of the terminal nodes z ∈ Z is mapped to an
outcome χi(z) ∈ Xi assigned to each i ∈ N . As the audience of this paper may
already be familiar with the definitions of an extensive form game, we leave the full
definition in the Appendix. Table 1.1 lists the key notations that we use in the rest
of the paper.
A dynamic mechanismD is said to be ex-post budget balanced if for all possible
outcomes, xN = (yN , pN) ∈ χN(Z), we have
∑
i∈N pi ≤ w(yN).
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Name Notation Representative element
Histories H h
Histories i is called to play Hi hi
Precedence relation over H ≺
Initial history h∅
Terminal histories Z z
Information sets for i Ii Ii
Actions available at Ii A(Ii) a
Table 1.1: Notation for Extensive Game Form
1.2.3 Weakly Dominant
The outcome of a bidder is fixed when we specify an initial history h ∈ H
and the strategies each player plays according to SN . Thus, we use ui(h∅, Si, S−i)
to denote the payoff when the game starts at h∅ and when bidders play SN .
Definition 1 (Weakly Dominant) A strategy Si is said to be weakly dominant
if, for all S ′i and S−i, we have
ui(h∅, Si, S−i) ≥ ui(h∅, S ′i, S−i) (1.1)
A mechanism is said to be strategy-proof (SP) if there exists a weakly dominant
strategy for each ui ∈ Ui.
1.2.4 Obviously Dominant
Obvious dominance is defined only on dynamic strategies. A strategy for bid-
der i in a dynamic mechanism D is a function Si that maps each information set
Ii ∈ Ii to an available action Si(Ii) ∈ A(Ii). Because the mechanism is nonstochas-
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tic, given a strategy profile SN = (Si)i∈N and a starting history h ∈ H, the path of
play and the terminal node are fixed. We denote the terminal node in this case by
z(h, SN), sometimes written as z(h, Si, S−i).
Definition 2 (Achievable Outcome) We say an outcome xi ∈ Xi is achievable
by strategy Si at Ii ∈ Ii if there exist h ∈ Ii and a strategy profile of other bidders,
S−i, such that
1. h∅ ≺ h ≺ z(h∅, Si, S−i) and
2. xi = χi(z(h∅, Si, S−i)).
In words, xi is achievable by Si at Ii means the information set Ii will be visited
and xi will be assigned to bidder i if all players play according to (Si, S−i) for some
strategy profile S−i. Let Xi(Si, Ii) denote all the outcomes that are achievable by Si
at Ii. Notice the definition does not require any optimality or equilibrium condition.
xi can be achievable by Si under some off-equilibrium or non-optimal strategies S−i.
We say xi is achievable by an action a ∈ A(Ii) if there exists Si : Si(Ii) = a such that
xi is achievable by Si at Ii. Let Xi(a) be the set of all achievable outcomes by action
a. Similarly, we say xi is achievable at Ii if there exists Si such that xi ∈ Xi(Si, Ii).
Let Xi(Ii) denote all achievable outcomes at Ii.
We say Ii ∈ Ii is on the path of strategy Si if there exist S−i and h ∈ Ii such
that h∅ ≺ h ≺ z(h∅, Si, S−i).
I ′i ≺ Ii if there exists h′ ∈ I ′i, h ∈ Ii such that h′ ≺ h.
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Definition 3 (Earliest Points of Departure, Li (2017)) Let Ii ∈ Ii be an in-




1. Si(Ii) 6= S ′i(Ii);
2. Ii is on the path of both strategies. (Implies Si = S
′
i on all predecessors of Ii.)
Definition 4 (Obviously Dominant, Li (2017)) Let D be a dynamic mecha-
nism on market Ω. Let Si be a strategy for i ∈ N and ui ∈ Ui. We say Si is
obviously dominant for ui if for all alternative strategy S
′
i and earliest point of de-
parture Ii of Si and S
′
i,
min{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Si, Ii)} ≥ max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(S ′i, Ii)} (1.2)
A dynamic mechanism is said to be obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if there
exists an obviously dominant strategy for all ui ∈ Ui and all i ∈ N .
Is it obvious to bid in an OSP mechanism? When a bidder is called to play
at Ii, he needs to know three pieces of information in order to make sure his choice
at this period dominates other alternative actions: first, what would be available in
each of the future contingencies; second, what he would do in those contingencies;
third, the best-case outcome of other actions. The first two are responsible for
figuring out the LHS of Equation (1.2), while the third is responsible for the RHS.
If any of the above is difficult to find out, the “obviously dominant” strategy might
not be that obvious to bidders. In the next section, we identify and formalize the
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characteristics of a mechanism that makes it easy for bidders to figure these pieces
of information.
1.3 Elements of Strategic Simplicity
In this section, we identify and formalize the elements of strategic simplicity
that exist in the one-dimensional OSP mechanisms but are missing in the definition
of OSP.
We argue that any criterion of strategic simplicity should cover at least the
following four aspects of simplicity. First, there should be a simple rule for bid-
ders to select the optimal action at each period given the information revealed by
the auctioneer. Second, it should be simple for the bidder to understand that the
optimality of the strategy does not depend on the choices of other bidders. Third,
the auction rules and the information revealed by the auctioneer should make it
easy for bidders to execute their optimal strategy. Finally, the auction rule should
be simple and predictable such that it is easy for bidders to verify the optimality
of their strategies. The definition of OSP does not explicitly characterize all the
above aspects of strategic simplicity. However, we can observe these elements in the
English Auction and the Single-dimensional mechanism proposed by Milgrom and
Segal (2020).
In this section, we first go over the one-dimensional mechanism and identify
those desirable properties. Then we go over each of these criteria and formalize
them for multi-dimensional problems. Finally, we propose a new solution concept
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called obviously regret-proof by combining all the elements we formalize.
1.3.1 Example: The One-Dimensional OSP Mechanism
Now we describe the descending clock mechanism in Milgrom and Segal (2020).
Consider the allocation problem for the FCC Incentive Auction described in Exam-
ple 2. We initialize the auction with every bidder being active, At = N , where At
is the set of active bidders at period t. For each t ≥ 1, the auctioneer calls an
active bidder i ∈ At to play. When i is called, the auctioneer announces the offered
outcome xit = (0, pit) to bidder i, which specifies that the bidder to relinquish his
rights to his endowment and to receive a payment pit. The bidder can choose either
to continue or to exit. When he exits, he secures his endowment outcome with zero
payment, x0i = (1, 0) and he becomes inactive. The auction proceeds to t + 1 with
At+1 = At\{i}. If he chooses to continue, two things may occur. First, he could be
called again at some future period, t′ > t. In which case, the announced offer drops
to xit′ = (0, pit′), where pit′ < pit. Once again, the bidder can choose to exit or
to continue once again. Because the announced payment only descends, it is often
referred to as the clock price. Second, the bidder could win outcome xit and become
inactive. Again, if this happens, the auction proceeds to t+ 1 with At+1 = At\{i}.
The auction concludes at T when AT = ∅.
We discuss the four aspects of strategic simplicity in this game.
1. The simplicity of the strategy: The dominant strategy in this game is simple
for bidders to follow. To follow the rule, the bidder first compute the most
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desirable terminal outcomes that can be reached from the current period. We
refer to this kind of outcomes as the fantasy outcomes, as those outcomes
are not necessarily fulfillable in an equilibrium. The rule instructs the bidder
to secure one of the fantasy outcomes whenever possible; otherwise, choose
any action that is needed to achieve one of the fantasy outcomes, as if he
only looks at the bright side and waiting for the best case to happen. In the
English auction, if a bidder prefers to win at the clock price to lose, then the
winning outcome with the current clock pricing is the unique fantasy outcome
for the bidder. This outcome is fulfilled only if the bidder chooses to continue
and all other bidders exit right away. The rule requires the bidder to choose
to continue to pursue his fantasy outcome. If at some point the clock prices
rises such that losing is weakly better than winning, then the losing outcome
becomes the new fantasy outcome. The rule then requires the bidder to secure
this fantasy outcome by choosing to exit. We call strategies following this
simple rule the cautiously optimistic strategies.
2. The simplicity of the optimality concept: It suffices for the bidder to under-
stand that whenever he is called to play, he will not regret choosing the action
that pursues his fantasy outcome. Bidders don’t need to understand the con-
cept of weakly or obviously strategic dominance to know that the optimality
of this strategy does not depend on the choices of other bidders.
3. The simplicity of executing the dominant strategy: In this auction, it is easy
for bidders to accurately execute the cautiously optimistic strategy. Because
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the auctioneer explicitly reveals the best-case outcome achievable by each of
the actions. Also, it is very straightforward to secure an outcome. Therefore,
executing the cautiously optimistic strategy is simple in this one dimensional
mechanism.
4. The simplicity of verifying the optimality: It is easy to verify that a bidder
does not regret playing the cautiously optimistic strategy. Because there exists
a clear pattern about the future availability of the outcomes a bidder forgoes.
When a bidder chooses to continue in order to pursue the winning outcome,
he knows that if the best-case did not occur, he will still be offered the chance
to secure the same exit outcome. Therefore, the worst case that can happen
when he plays the cautiously optimistic strategy is that he chooses to exit in
some future period. We call this clear pattern about the availability of forgone
outcome the strong persistence of exits. It makes it easy for bidders to verify
that their cautiously optimistic strategies are indeed regret-free.
In the rest of this section, we will extend and formalize the above concepts for
multi-dimensional mechanisms. Then we combine all the elements and arrive at a
new criterion of strategic simplicity, obviously regret-proofness (ORP).
1.3.2 Simplicity of the Dominant Strategy
To make it easy for bidders to participate in a mechanism, there should be
a clear rule for the bidder to select the best action according to the information
revealed by the auctioneer. Also, the rule should be applicable to all periods that he
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is called to play. In general, a strategy can be a very large mapping if the game has
a large number of contingencies. Even if the strategy is already solved and given
to the bidder, without a simple pattern, the strategy is merely an overwhelmingly
long list of what to do in each of the contingencies. Then it would not be easy for
bidders to handle this list and to look up what to do when he is in the real auction.
Therefore, to formalize a criterion for strategic simplicity, we need to be explicit
about the rule for bidders to choose their optimal actions.
The simple strategy that we are about to formalize is called cautiously op-
timistic strategy. We first assume that the bidder knows his fantasy outcomes
whenever he is called to play. Fantasy outcomes are the most desirable outcomes
achievable in the game tree from the current period. Those outcomes need not to
be assurable in an equilibrium. However, when some of them are, the cautious part
requires the bidder to secure one of the assurable outcomes. Otherwise, the opti-
mistic part requires the bidder to pursue one of the fantasy outcomes by choosing
the action needed to achieve it.
Below, we first introduce the optimistic strategy, then refine it with the notion
of cautious. We show that even the notion of optimistic strategy may appear to
be myopic, it is necessary for all weakly dominant strategies. Then we show that




Now we introduce the optimistic strategy. An optimistic strategy always se-
lects an action with the most preferred best-case outcome. It is called optimistic
because the strategy is formed as if the bidder is choosing naively, without consid-
ering whether the best-case outcome can be realized in an equilibrium. Therefore,
we call the best-case outcome fantasy outcome. We formalize the above concepts as
follows.
Let Ii ∈ Ii, an outcome xi is said to be a fantasy outcome of action a ∈ A(Ii) for
ui ∈ Ui if xi ∈ arg max{ui(x′i)|x′i ∈ Xi(a)}. That is, xi is the most preferred outcome
achievable by action a. Similarly, we say an outcome xi is a fantasy outcome at Ii
for ui if xi ∈ arg max{ui(x′i)|x′i ∈ Xi(Ii)}. Let X∗i (Ii, ui) denote the set of fantasy
outcomes at Ii for ui.
Definition 5 (Optimistic Strategy) A strategy Si for bidder i ∈ N is said to be
optimistic for ui ∈ Ui if for all Ii on the path of Si, if Si(Ii) = a, then
max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(a)} ≥ max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(a′)} (1.3)
for all a′ ∈ A(Ii).
The condition described in Equation (1.3) echoes the condition in Equa-
tion (1.4). That is, if a worst-case outcome of following strategy Si and choosing
a is better than the fantasy outcome of any other a′, then a must have the most
preferred fantasy outcome among all available actions. It turns out that this is not
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only a necessary condition for obviously dominant strategy, it is also a necessary
condition for all weakly dominant strategy.
Theorem 1 Let D be a dynamic mechanism on Ω. If a strategy Si on D is weakly
dominant for ui ∈ Ui, then Si is optimistic for ui.
The intuition behind the necessary part is simple. If a more desirable outcome
is achievable by another action, it implies that there exists some strategy profile
(S ′i, S
′
−i) such that when other bidders play S
′
−i, the better outcome x
′
i will be
assigned to i if i deviates to S ′i. This is a violation of weak dominance as well as
obvious dominance.
However, the optimistic strategy is not a definite guide for bidders in OSP
mechanisms. Because it is possible for some fantasy outcome x∗i ∈ X∗i (Ii, ui) to be
achievable by more than one action. In that case, choosing an action that has the
most preferred fantasy outcome might not be obviously dominant. This condition is
prevalent in OSP mechanisms. For example, in the English Auction with one good
to be sold, when the clock price is already above the bidder’s value for that object,
the fantasy outcome for that bidder is to lose, as there is no way he could win and
get a positive payoff. However, he could achieve this outcome either by exiting at
the current period or by continuing in the current period and exiting at some future
period. Thus, choosing both actions in the current period is optimistic. As it should
be clear in this example, the bidder should secure his fantasy outcome whenever he
is able to. That is exactly the refinement we are about to introduce.
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Cautiously Optimistic Strategies
To refine the concept of optimistic, we introduce the concept of cautiously
optimistic. First, we formalize the idea of securing an outcome. We say a strategy
Si secures outcome xi ∈ Xi at information set Ii ∈ Ii if Xi(Si, Ii) = {xi}. Intuitively,
this means that starting from all histories in Ii, playing according to Si implies his
outcome is fixed at xi regardless of what other players do in future periods. We
say xi is assurable at Ii if there exists some strategy that secures xi at Ii. When a
bidder secures an outcome, it is like the mechanism has concluded for that bidder.
It should be clear that in the English Auction, to secure the losing outcome is
equivalent to exiting the auction. In a multi-dimensional and multi-unit OSP mech-
anism, we can generalize the concept and offer bidders multiple assurable outcomes.
Then, a cautious way to bid in this kind of mechanism is to exit and secure a fantasy
outcome whenever some of the most preferred outcomes become assurable.
Definition 6 (Cautiously Optimistic Strategy) We say a strategy Si is cau-
tiously optimistic for ui if the following conditions hold:
1. If X∗i (Ii, ui) contains some assurable outcomes, then Si secures one of the
assurable outcomes in X∗i (Ii, ui) at Ii.
2. Otherwise, if Si(Ii) = a then Xi(a) ∩X∗i (Ii, ui) 6= ∅.
The cautiously optimistic strategies always exist. Because we only consider
games with finite length, the set of all possible outcomes is finite. Therefore, the
set of achievable outcomes for each action also is finite. Because there always exist
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some most preferred outcomes in a finite set, the optimistic strategy always exits.
Because the “cautious” part refines the strategy only when there is a tie, it does not
affect the existence of the strategy.
Note that the cautiously optimistic strategies are not unique. If there are
multiple assurable fantasy outcomes at Ii, since all of them are payoff equivalent,
securing any of them is cautiously optimistic.
Even with the cautious part, the cautiously optimistic strategy may still sound
somewhat naive. Because it pursues the fantasy outcome without caring how the
outcome could be fulfilled, and whether it is rational for other bidders to play the
strategies to fulfill this outcome. If the fantasy outcome is not guaranteed to be
fulfilled, any rational bidder may question whether he would regret forgoing some
of the second best outcomes while pursuing the first best. We argue that if the
mechanism is OSP, bidders will never regret playing a cautiously optimistic strategy.
But before we arrive at that result, we first have to formalize what do we mean by
having no regret.
Regret-free Strategies
In this part, we propose a dominant strategy concept that makes it easy for
a bidder to understand that the optimality of his action does not depend on what
other people do. We call this condition regret-free, as the bidder will not regret
all of his choices. This condition is equivalent to being obviously dominant, but is
conceptually simpler.
24
Notice that the definition of an obviously dominant strategy describes a condi-
tion that a strategy dominates all other alternative strategies. To fully understand
the optimality of the strategy, bidders need to conceptually construct alternative
strategies and to consider the earliest points of departure. We argue that this is an
unnecessary complication. For bidders with little training in game theory, it is hard
for them to grasp the full concept behind alternative strategies the earliest points
of departure.
However, what is really defined in obviously dominant strategy is that contin-
gent on being called to play, all the outcomes achievable by the deviating actions
are not better than the worst-case outcome of not deviating. Here, we emphasize
the dominance relations between actions, rather than entire strategies. Thus, it is
easier for bidders to comprehend and to verify the optimality. Also, this interpre-
tation does not require bidders to construct alternative strategies at all, because
the achievable outcomes are characteristics of the game tree, and they should be
intuitive enough. We now formalize this concept as follows:
Definition 7 (Regretfree Strategy) A strategy Si is said to be regret-free in a
dynamic mechanism D if for all Ii that is on the path of Si, if Si(Ii) = a, then for
all a′ ∈ A(Ii)\{a}, we have
min{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Si, Ii)} ≥ max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(a′)} (1.4)
The above definition is equivalent to Li’s (2017) definition for an obviously
dominant strategy.
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Theorem 2 A strategy Si in mechanism D is obviously dominant if and only if it
is regret-free.
Regret-Proof Mechanisms
Now we formalize the notion of the strategic simplicity of a mechanism where
all cautiously optimistic strategies are regret-free. This condition guarantees bidders
that it is safe for them to pursue their fantasy outcomes and that they will not regret
each of their decisions.
Definition 8 A dynamic mechanism D is said to be regret-proof if for all i ∈ N
and ui ∈ Ui, if Si is cautiously optimistic for ui, then Si is regret-free for ui.
This condition turns out to be equivalent to OSP. That means that for all
OSP mechanisms, the cautiously optimistic strategy is the simple rule for the bidders
to follow. Conversely, because regret-free is equivalent to obviously dominant, any
mechanisms satisfying this condition is OSP.
Theorem 3 Let D be a dynamic mechanism on market Ω. Then D is OSP if and
only if it is regret-proof.
Even though regret-free and OSP are equivalent, there are some conceptual
differences in their definitions. First, regret-proofness explicitly indicates the sim-
ple rule for bidders to follow, and it emphasizes its desirable incentive property.
Therefore, it should be easier for bidders to execute the strategy and comprehend
its optimality. While OSP is intended to be a stronger version of strategy-proofness.
26
It better connects and contrasts with the concept of strategic dominance. Second,
for regret-proofness, we do not claim that it is obvious for bidders to “verify” that
the cautiously optimistic strategy is regret-free. Just as verifying obviously domi-
nant strategies, the bidder still needs to compute the best- and worst-case outcomes.
Therefore, especially for mechanisms of higher dimensionality, the regret-proof may
be a better term and a better interpretation of the condition defined in OSP.
In the following parts, we then focus on the elements of a mechanism that
simplifies the execution and the verification of the cautiously optimistic strategy.
1.3.3 Simplicity of Executing the Optimal Strategy
To accurately execute the cautiously optimistic strategy, there are still a few
things that bidders need to determine. First, bidders need to know the best-case
outcomes achievable by each of the available actions. Second, they need to know
which of them is assurable, and how to secure the outcome. In an arbitrary multi-
dimensional mechanism, the set of achievable outcomes from an action may be large.
However, the auctioneer can help to simplify the computation by summarizing the
relevant information for bidders. Just as in the personal clock mechanism, the
auctioneer explicitly announces the best-case outcome to continue and the best-case
outcome to exit for bidders. In this part, we generalize this idea to multi-dimensional
problems.
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Continuation and Exit Outcomes
The first step to summarize and simplify the information is to filter out the out-
comes that are irrelevant for bidders to execute their cautiously optimistic strategies.
Roughly speaking, it suffices for the auctioneer to let bidders know the outcomes
that could be the fantasy outcome to some ui ∈ Ui. In the following, we formalize
this idea for both assurable and nonassurable outcomes.
Given xi, x
′
i ∈ Xi, we say x′i dominates xi if x′ik ≥ xik for all k ∈ Ki. We say
x′i strictly dominates xi if x
′
i dominates xi and p
′
i > pi. Let X
′
i ⊆ Xi, we say xi is
undominated if there is no other x′i ∈ X ′i such that x′i dominates xi; we say xi is
weakly undominated in X ′i if there exists no x
′
i ∈ X ′i such that x′i strictly dominates
xi.
Lemma 1 1. There exists ui ∈ Ui such that ui(xi) > ui(x′i) for all x′i ∈ Xi(Ii) ∪
XGi (Ii)\{xi} if and only if xi is undominated in Xi(Ii) ∪XGi (Ii).
2. There exists ui ∈ Ui such that ui(xi) ≥ ui(x′i) for all x′i ∈ Xi(Ii)\{xi} if and
only if xi is weakly undominated in Xi(Ii).
We say xgi ∈ Xi is a forgone outcome at Ii if there exists I ′i ∈ ψi(Ii) and
a′ ∈ A(I ′i) such that a′ /∈ ψi(Ii) and x
g
i ∈ Xi(a′). In words, x
g
i is an outcome
achievable by some action that was not chosen in a previously visited information
set. Let XGi (Ii) denote the set of all forgone outcomes at Ii.
We say an outcome xi is an exit outcome if xi is assurable and weakly undom-
inated in Xi(Ii) ∪XGi (Ii). Let XEi (Ii) be the set of all exit outcomes in Xi(Ii). An
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outcome xi ∈ Xi(Ii) is said to be a continuation outcome at Ii if the following three
conditions hold: (1) xi is nonassurable at Ii, (2) xi is undominated in Xi(Ii)∪XGi (Ii)
and (3) xi /∈ XGi (Ii). Let XCi (Ii) denote the set of continuation outcomes at Ii.
Intuitively, an exit outcome is an achievable outcome that some bidders may
choose to secure. A continuation outcome is an outcome that can induce some
bidders to visit the current information set and still choose to continue.
The following result shows that it is sufficient for the auctioneer to reveal just
the exit and continuation outcomes to bidders for them to play their cautiously
optimistic strategy.
Theorem 4 Let D be a regret-proof mechanism. Then for all i ∈ N , ui ∈ Ui, Si
cautiously optimistic for ui and Ii on the path of Si, we have
1. if Si secures a fantasy outcome xi ∈ X∗i (Ii, ui) at Ii, then xi is an exit outcome.
2. if Si does not secure any outcome, there exists a continuation outcome in
Xi(Si(Ii)) ∩X∗i (Ii, ui).
Conversely, if xi is a continuation outcome at Ii, then there exists ui ∈ Ui such
that for all cautiously optimistic strategy Si for ui, Ii is on the path of Si and
X∗i (Ii, ui) = {xi}.
In words, the first part of the above theorem says that a bidder either chooses to
pursue a continuation outcome or choose to secure an exit outcome. That is, only the
exit and continuation outcomes are the relevant candidates that a bidder may pursue
with his cautiously optimistic strategy. Thus, it suffices for the auctioneer to reveal
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just the set of continuation and exit outcomes associated with each action. The
bidders can identify the fantasy outcome to pursue from the announced outcomes.
The second part of the theorem says that it is necessary for the auctioneer to
reveal all continuation outcomes. This is because that for any continuation outcome,
there exist some bidders who visit this information set only to pursue this outcome
and that he will continue to pursue it in this period. If the auctioneer did not
reveal this outcome, the bidder will not be able to execute his cautiously optimistic
strategy accurately.
Explicit Exits
We now characterize the structure of the available actions that make it simple
for bidders to secure exit outcomes. First, we require that for all exit outcomes, there
exists a unique dedicated action that secures and only secures the exit outcome.
Also, once it is chosen, the bidder will never be called again. Second, we requires
that the mechanism has no redundant actions.
We say an action a ∈ A(Ii) is an exit action if Xi(a) is a singleton and i is not
called to play after choosing a. Let Ei(Ii) be the set of exit actions at Ii. We say
that an action is a continuation action if Xi(a) contains some continuation actions.
Because the exit action achieves only one outcome, the worst- and best-case
payoff of choosing it is obvious to bidders. Thus, it should be the default action a
bidder chooses when he needs to secure an exit outcome. Once every exit outcome
has a dedicated exit action, we claim that any action a ∈ A(ii) that is neither a
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continuation action nor an exit action is redundant. By Theorem 4, a bidder either
chooses to pursue a continuation outcome or secure an exit outcome. Because a is not
a continuation action, Xi(a) contains no continuation outcomes, bidders choosing to
pursue continuation outcomes will not choose it. For bidders choosing to secure an
exit outcome, there is a dedicated exit action that secures the same exit outcome.
Therefore, action a is redundant.
We now state the full requirement:
Definition 9 We say D has explicit exits if for all i ∈ N , Ii ∈ Ii, the following
conditions hold:
1. for all exit outcomes xei ∈ XEi (Ii), there exits an unique exit action a ∈ Ei(Ii)
with Xi(a) = {xei}.
2. for all a ∈ A(Ii), a is either an exit action or a continuation action.
In short, mechanisms with explicit exits enforce a clear way for bidders to se-
cure an exit outcome. They keep the essential continuation actions and exit actions,
and remove all redundant ones.
The Clock Announcement
Now we are ready to formalize the multi-dimensional clock announcement for
regret-proof mechanisms with explicit exits. In a clock announcement, the auc-
tioneer tells each bidder the set of exit actions and the set of continuation actions.
For continuation action, the auctioneer tells the bidder only the set of continuation
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outcomes. If a is an exit action, the auctioneer reveals the unique exit outcome it
secures. According to Theorem 4, to ensure bidders can accurately identify their
cautiously optimistic strategy, it suffices for the auctioneer to reveal just the contin-
uation outcomes and the exit outcomes to bidders. Also, since all exit outcomes have
dedicated exit actions, there is no need to announce the achievable exit outcomes
for a continuation action.
Formally, let D be a regret-proof mechanism with explicit exits. The clock
announcement at Ii is a tuple, (Ci(Ii), Ei(Ii), X
A
i ), such that
1. Ei(Ii) is the set of exit actions at Ii.
2. Ci(Ii) is the set of continuation actions at Ii.
3. XAi (a) denotes the set of announced outcomes for an announced action a ∈
Ei(Ii) ∪ Ci(Ii), such that
• if a ∈ Ei(Ii), then XAi (a) = Xi(a);
• if a ∈ Ci(Ii), then XAi (a) = XCi (Ii) ∩Xi(a).
Notice that an announcement is purely a way for the auctioneer to summarize
and communicate the current auction state to bidders. It does not impose any
restrictions on the extensive form.
Descending Clock
The reason that this is called the clock announcement is that the announced
continuation outcomes become inferior over time. This is
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Lemma 2 Let D be a regret-proof mechanism and let Ii ≺ I ′i such that XCi (I ′i) 6= ∅,
then for all x′i ∈ XCi (I ′i), there exists xi ∈ XCi (Ii) such that xi ≥ x′i.
Definition 10 Let Ii ∈ Ii and let I ′i be the immediate predecessor of Ii. Let a′ ∈
A(Ii) such that a
′ is the action taken to reach a. We say Ii is a descended node if
there exists a continuation outcome x′i at I
′
i such that x
′
i ∈ Xi(a′) but x′i /∈ Xi(Ii).
1.3.4 Simplicity for Verifying Optimality
To verify that the cautiously optimistic strategy is regret-free, a bidder needs
to know the best-case outcome of an action and the worst-case payoff of following
the cautiously optimistic strategy. The best-case outcomes are easy to see thanks to
the explicit exits and the clock announcements. Therefore, what is left is to make
it simple for bidders to know the worst-case outcome of following the cautiously
optimistic strategy.
What we do is to make it clear for bidders that all of the current exit out-
comes will be assurable again whenever some of their fantasy outcomes are no longer
achievable. Therefore, the bidder always has the chance to secure one of those exit
outcomes when the first best did not occur. Hence, the worst case that can happen
by playing the cautiously optimistic strategy is that the bidder chooses to secure
one of the exit outcomes in some future period. Therefore, the bidder will not regret
forgoing the exit outcome in the current period in pursuit of his fantasy outcomes.
For bidder i, there are two possible scenarios in which his fantasy outcomes
may disappear after he chooses a continuation action a ∈ A(Ii). In the first case,
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bidder i is called again at some future information set I ′i and some of the continuation
outcomes in Xi(a) are no longer achievable in Xi(I
′
i). This is the generalized notion
of the descending clock. In this case, we require that all the exit outcomes at Ii are
assurable at I ′i. That is, X
E
i (Ii) ⊆ Xi(I ′i).
For the second case, i is not called again before the auction reaches some
terminal node z ∈ Z, where bidder i is assigned the outcome χi(z). If Xi(a) contains
more than one continuation outcome, in bidder i’s perspective, all continuation
outcomes other than χi(z) disappears. The core idea behind the Strong Persistence
of Exits is that whenever some continuation outcomes disappear, all the previous
exit outcomes should be assurable. But that conflicts with z being a terminal node.
Therefore, we should prevent this case to make it clear for bidders that his cautiously
optimistic strategy is regret-free. That means that we require that when a bidder
chooses an action with more than one continuation outcome, he must be called again
in some future information sets.
The above requirement is relevant only in multi-dimensional mechanisms. For
example, in the English Auction, there is only one continuation outcome associated
with the continuation action. Therefore, if a bidder chooses to continue, we know
that he prefers the continuation outcome over the exit outcome. Thus, when all
other bidders leave, the auctioneer can assign the unique continuation outcome to
the winning bidder without calling him to action again.
The above two conditions are formalized as follows:
Definition 11 We say D satisfies the property of strong persistence of exits if the
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following two conditions hold:
1. if Ii is a descended node, let I
′
i be the immediate predecessor of Ii, then
XEi (Ii) ⊇ XEi (I ′i).
2. for all Ii ∈ Ii and a ∈ A(Ii), if Xi(a) contains more than one continuation
outcomes, then for all z ∈ Z, if Ii ≺ z, then there exists I ′i such that Ii ≺ I ′i ≺
z.
In words, the first condition says that the set of exit outcomes does not shrink
whenever the clock descends. The second condition guarantees that when there
are multiple continuation outcomes achievable by the same action, the auctioneer
will always call him to play in some future period. Because he is called to play,
the first condition can kick in to ensure that the previous exit outcomes are again
available, making sure the bidder has no regret. In short, the combination of the
two conditions makes it easy for a bidder to know that he will not regret forgoing
any of the exit outcomes.
The Single Continuation Property
One may ask whether the bidders might regret forgoing other continuation
outcomes. Because we may have multiple continuation actions, choosing one of
them also implies forgoing other continuation outcomes. In the following result, we
show that in any regret-proof mechanism, if a bidder chooses a continuation action
a, all the continuation outcomes achievable by other actions will be less desirable
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than some exit outcome xei . Therefore, if a bidder does not regret forgoing x
e
i , nor
will he regret forgoing the continuation outcome.
Theorem 5 Let D be an regret-proof dynamic mechanism. Let ui ∈ Ui, let Si be
a cautiously optimistic strategy for ui and let Ii on the path of Si. If X
∗
i (Ii, ui)
contains no assurable outcomes, then there exists a ∈ A(Ii) such that
• X∗i (Ii, ui) ⊆ Xi(a) and
• X∗i (Ii, ui) ∩Xi(a′) = ∅ for all a′ ∈ A(Ii)\{a}.
• If xi is a continuation outcome at Ii but xi /∈ Xi(a), then there exist xei assur-
able at Ii such that ui(x
e
i ) ≥ ui(xi).
In words, this result says that at each information set, there is at most one
continuation action that is relevant to the bidder. All the fantasy outcomes are
achievable only by that action. Furthermore, all the other continuation actions
are dominated in the sense that each of the outcomes they can achieve is worse
than some exit outcome. Therefore, if a bidder does not regret forgoing that exit
outcome, he will not regret forgoing the continuation outcome. Thus, we do not
have to maintain the persistence of the forgone continuation outcomes. It suffices
just to enforce the persistence of “exits”.
The conditions of the extensive form that are needed to enforce this property
are stated in Definition 15. It might seem a little be technical. However, bidders do
not have to check if the extensive form or the auction rule satisfies this condition.
Because as long as the mechanism is regret-proof, the bidder can directly observe the
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announced outcomes and easily verify that there is only one relevant continuation
action. Therefore, it is still easy for a bidder to see that he will not regret following
the cautiously optimistic strategy.
1.3.5 The Obviously Regret-Proof Mechanism
Now we are ready to propose the new solution concept by combining all the
aspects of simplicity formalized in previous parts.
Definition 12 (Obviously Regret-Proof Mechanism) Let D be a dynamic mech-
anism on market Ω, we say D is obviously regret-proof if the following conditions
are met:
1. D is regret-proof,
2. D has explicit exits,
3. D implements the descending clock announcement,
4. D satisfies the property of the strong persistence of exits.
To summarize, obviously regret-proofness (ORP) requires a mechanism to be
easy for a bidder to understand that he will not regret selecting actions cautiously
and optimistically whenever he is called to play. The regret-proof part is equivalent
to being OSP. But it does not guarantee obviousness. The obviousness comes from
the requirements of explicit exits, clock announcements, and the strong persistence
of exits. That means that, we require that securing an outcome is simple and
immediate; the auctioneer announces summarized information that reveals only the
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outcomes that bidders would pursue and all of the available exits; and finally, the
set of exit outcomes does not shrink whenever the best-case did not happen and the
clock descends.
Now we have a criterion for strategic simplicity. Then the next question is
whether this notion of strategic simplicity can be implemented in a multi-dimensional
mechanism. The next section confirms it by proposing a generic implementation of
the ORP mechanism.
1.4 The PED Mechanism
In this section, we present the Persistent Exit Descending (PED) mechanism,
which is designed to be ORP. Or we can also interpret the PED mechanism as a
reformulation of ORP mechanisms in the language of auction rules, as opposed to
the characteristics of extensive forms. We first present the auction rules, and then
we use some examples to demonstrate how they work and why it is a meaningful
generalization of the personal clock mechanism and the English Auction. Finally,
we present the results of its generality. That is, the PED mechanisms are the generic
implementation of all ORP mechanisms. Also, the PED mechanisms also implement
all well-behaved OSP implementable allocation rules.
1.4.1 Auction Rules
We introduce the PED mechanism in the following order. First, we intro-
duce the flow of the auction; second, we introduce the requirement for what the
38
auctioneer should announce to bidders. Third, we present the requirements for the
evolution of the announcements. Finally, we state the desirable properties of the
PED mechanisms.
The Flow of the Auction
At t = 0, the auctioneer initializes the auction with the set of active bidders
A0 = N . At each period t ≥ 0, the auctioneer calls a bidder i ∈ A(t) to play. When
bidder i is called to play, the auctioneer offers him two sets of actions: (Eit, Cit).
Actions in Eit are called exit actions, while actions in Cit are called continuation
actions. For each action a ∈ Eit ∪ Cit, the auctioneer also announces a set of
outcomes achievable by this action, XAi (a) ⊆ Xi. Bidder i observes (Eit, Cit) and
XAi (a) for all offered actions, and then submits one action ait in Eit ∪ Cit to the
auctioneer. Then the auction enters the next period, t+ 1.
Let XEit = ∪a∈EitXAi (a) be the set of all outcomes specified in the exit actions.
Similarly, let XCit = ∪a∈CitXAi (a) be the set of outcomes specified in the continuation
actions. Let Xit = X
C
it ∪XEit .
We require that for all exit actions, a ∈ Eit, XAi (a) is a singleton. If a ∈ Eit,
XAi (a) = {xi}, and bidder i chooses a at period t, bidder i will be assigned xi at the
end of the auction. Also, bidder i becomes inactive, that is, At+1 = At\{i}.
If bidder i chooses to continue with ait ∈ Cit, one of the following two cases
will happen in some future period t′. First, bidder i wins XAi (ait) and must secure
one of the winning outcomes in XAi (ait). If X
A
i (ait) is a singleton, then i is directly
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assigned the winning outcome and will not be called to play. Otherwise, i is called
at t′, and is offered XCit = ∅ and XEit = XAi (ait). That means that, i has to choose
which one in XAi (ait) to secure. After t
′, i becomes inactive.
In the second case, the clock descends in the sense that for all x′i ∈ Xit′ , there
exists xi ∈ Xit such that x′i ≤ xi. That is to say, each of the offered outcomes
in XAi (ait) becomes either weakly inferior or it disappears. However, in this case,
we require the exit outcomes to be persistent, XEit ⊆ XEit′ . That means that, we
allow some of the weakly descended outcomes to turn into exit outcomes. But once
they become exit outcomes, they will always be exit outcomes whenever the clock
descends.
The Requirements of the Announced Outcomes
There are a few requirements for the announced outcomes. We require that
each xi ∈ XEit is weakly undominated in Xit and that each xi ∈ XCit is undominated
in Xit. Also, we require that each of the announced outcomes in X
C
it is achievable
but nonassurable in this mechanism. This requirement implies two guidelines for
the auctioneer. First, if there is no way that an outcome can be fulfilled, it should
not be announced at all. Second, if an outcome will not descend or disappear in any
case, announce it as the exit outcome, not the continuation outcome. The purpose








i ∈ XAi (a′), there exists xei ∈ XEit and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that xei ≥ λxi + (1−
λ)x′i. This condition is needed to satisfy the single continuation property defined in
Definition 15. It is necessary to guarantee that there is at most one continuation
action relevant to all types of bidders. This condition, together with the strong
persistence of exits, is sufficient to guarantee the mechanism is regret-free.
1.4.2 PED is a Meaningful Multi-Dimensional Generalization
We now argue that the PED mechanism is a meaningful generalization of the
English Auction and the personal clock auction. The PED mechanism collapses to
the personal clock mechanism if there is only one good to be allocated to i, and that
good is his endowment. In that case, we have XCit = {(0, pit)}, and XEit = {x0i } =
{(1, 0)} in each period. Because there is only one continuation outcome and one
exit outcome, there is only one continuation action and one exit action, as in the
personal clock mechanism.
The PED mechanism collapses to the English Auction if there is only one
common good to allocate to all bidders, and they are alternately called to offer
the same outcome. In this case, XEit = {(0, 0)} and XCit = {(1, pit)} with pit ≤ 0.
The payment pit ≤ 0 means that the bidder should pay |pit| to the client if he
wins. The mechanism is still “descending” in a sense that pit′ < pit if t
′ > t. It is
called an “ascending clock” auction in the literature because usually the auctioneer
announces |pit| ≥ 0. However, the nature of the PED mechanism, including the
English Auction, is that the outcome achievable by choosing to continue becomes
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less and less desirable.
The Simplified but Multi-Dimensional FCC Incentive Auction Exam-
ple
Let’s revisit Example 4 to see how a PED mechanism works for this simplified,
but multi-dimensional version of the FCC Incentive Auction. In this example, we
have two UHF station owners and two VHF station owners, but the buyer wants
only one of the UHF stations. We model this problem in a way such that these
four bidders are divided into two competing groups. Each group contains one UHF
owner and one VHF owner, that is {1, 3} and {2, 4}. Then the two groups must
compete for the right to clear the UHF station for some compensation in a PED
mechanism.
At t = 0, 1, offer the VHF bidders XCit = {(0, pit)} and XEit = {(1, 0)}. That
is, ask them if they are willing to clear their station at the clock price pit. Based
on their response, make conditional offers to the paired UHF owners. If bidder 3
chooses to continue at t = 1, then at t = 3, we offer bidder 1 one continuation action
and one exit action, such that XC1t = {(0, 0, p1t), (0, 1, p1m)} and XE1t = {(1, 0, 0)}.
That is, if bidder 1 chooses to continue, he might have the chance to sell his station
at p1t or move to bidder 3’s station and receive payment p1m. Or he could choose to
exit and just keep his endowment. If bidder 3 chooses to exit at t = 1, do not offer
bidder 1 the chance to move at t = 3, that is, XC1t = {(0, 0, p1t)}. Offer similarly to
bidder 2 at t = 4. Then we can alternately lower the clock prices pit for i = 1, 2, 3, 4
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for the two groups to compete the right to clear the UHF station.
If one of the VHF bidders chooses to exit, the problem for the paired UHF
bidder falls back to the one-dimensional one in Example 2. But if the paired VHF
station chooses to continue, he has an additional offer to move. Therefore, even if
the clock price to sell pit may have gotten too low, if the option to move is still
acceptable, the UHF bidder will still choose to continue. Therefore, the cost of
moving to a VHF station becomes another dimension to compete with bidder 2.
Also, we can have bidders 3 and 4 compete by lowering their clock prices. If one of
them exits, we must immediately remove the moving outcome from the continuation
outcomes of the paired UHF bidder. The winning UHF station is determined when
his UHF opponent chooses to exit. When that happens, he has the chance to secure
one of the outcomes in his previously chosen continuation action. If the paired VHF
station has exited, that means he will sell his station at the most recent clock price.
If the VHF station is still active, he will be called again and he must choose between
selling and moving. If the winning UHF bidder chooses to move, the paired VHF
owner wins his continuation outcome and will have to transfer his station to the
UHF owner. If the UHF winner chooses to sell, the VHF owner will be forced to
exit.
In this example, we see that the competition intensifies when we expand the
possibility of transactions compared to the unit-supply model. The two UHF owners
are not only competing on the reserve value of their endowed spectrum, but they
are also competing on the cost to move to a VHF station. The PED mechanism
can determine multi-lateral transactions that have a higher social surplus, or it can
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increase the probability of having a transaction. Therefore, the PED mechanism is
a generalization with meaningful welfare implications.
1.4.3 PED is the Generic Implementation of ORP
We now state that, not only is PED designed to be ORP, but also all ORP
mechanism are PED mechanisms. Therefore, we can say that PED is the way
ORP mechanisms are implemented in the language of auction rules, instead of the
characteristics of extensive form. Thus, if a market designer wishes to implement
an ORP mechanism, the PED mechanism is the mechanism of choice.
Theorem 6 A dynamic mechanism is ORP if and only if it is a PED mechanism.
Because ORP implies OSP, it also means that the PED mechanism is a multi-
dimensional OSP implementation.
Corollary 7 A PED mechanism is OSP.
Verifying Regret-Proofness
If we claim the PED mechanism is obviously regret-proof, then at least it
should not be too hard for us to understand that it is regret-proof from the above
rules and the observed announcement. First, we restate the cautiously optimistic
strategy.
When bidder i is called to play given the announced outcomes, Xit, the bidder
first computes the most desirable announced outcomes X∗it. If some of the most
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desirable outcomes are exit outcomes, then arbitrarily choose one and select the
corresponding action to secure it. Otherwise, the bidder will observe that all his
most favorite outcomes are achievable by only one continuation action in Cit, select
that action.
We can verify that the strategy is indeed regret-free. First, if i chooses to secure
an exit outcome. Then the worst-case outcome of this strategy trivially equals the
secured outcome. Since it is the most preferred outcome, it is better than all other
exits. Also, because the clock only descends, there is no way he can get a more
desirable outcome by choosing to continue. Therefore, he will not regret choosing
to secure this outcome. Next, if the bidder chooses to continue, then whenever any
of his fantasy outcome in X∗it becomes unachievable, the previously available exits
will again be assurable. Therefore, the worst-case to happen is that he chooses one
of the exits in some future period. Therefore, the worst-case payoff of following this
strategy is not worse than the best-case payoff of any other deviation.
1.4.4 No Loss of Generality
Now we formalize what we mean when we say that the PED mechanism im-
plements all well-behaved OSP-implementable allocation rules.
A direct mechanism is a pair of functions M = (αN , ρN), such that αN : UN →
F and ρN : Ui → R|N |. We say a bidder is a winner in allocation yN ∈ F if yi 6= y0i .
Let n(yN) ≡ {i ∈ N |yi 6= y0i } denotes the set of winners for yN .
Definition 13 We say D OSP-implements M if for all uN ∈ UN , there exists SN
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such that for ui, we have
1. Si is obviously dominant for all i ∈ N , and
2. χi(z(h0, SN)) = (αi(uN), ρi(uN)).
In which case, we say M is OSP-implementable.
When we mentioned a well-behaved allocation rule earlier, we referred to mono-
tonicity. Intuitively, it means that when all bidders report an alternative preference
where the currently assigned outcome becomes more attractive, they should all be
assigned the same outcome. This condition also implies that, if a coalition of bidders
values their allocation more, then not only the assignment to this coalition should
stay unchanged, but also the assignment to other bidders should be the same.
To formalize it, we first must define a set of partial orders on Ui based on the
relative attractiveness of an outcome xi. Let Ū(xi, ui) ≡ {x′i ∈ Xi|ui(xi) ≥ ui(xi)}
denote the upper contour set. For each xi ∈ Xi, we define a relation on Ui: ui ≥xi u′i
if Ū(xi, ui) ⊆ Ū(xi, u′i) Intuitively, if the upper contour set of xi shrinks, then fewer
outcomes are more desirable than xi. Hence, the smaller the upper contour set, the
more valuable xi is relative to other outcomes. On the other hand, suppose ui and
u′i have the same upper contour sets at xi, quasi-linearity requires that ui and u
′
i
represent the same preference.
Lemma 3 For all xi ∈ Xi, the relation ≥xi is transitive, reflexive, and anti-
symmetric on Ui. That is, ≥xi is a partial order on Ui.
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Definition 14 A direct mechanism M = (αN , ρN) is said to be monotonic if for
all uN ∈ UN , if αN(uN) = yN , ρN(uN) = pN , xN = (yN , pN), then for all u′N ∈ UN
such that u′i ≥xi ui for all i ∈ N , we have αN(u′N) = yN .
Finally, we are ready to formally state the result:
Theorem 8 Let M be a monotonic direct mechanism, then M is OSP-implementable
if and only if M is PED-implementable and therefore ORP-implementable.
The reason we need monotonicity is to prevent cases like the following: Sup-
pose there are two different actions at Ii, and both of them secure the same outcome
xi. Let ui xi u′i and both preferences are supposed to secure xi at Ii. Then there
could be an equilibrium where ui and u
′
i take different actions, and the auctioneer
is able to make different arrangements to the rest of the bidders based on the choice
of actions. Then when we remove the duplicated action, we inevitably change the
equilibrium outcomes. Then this OSP mechanism cannot be reconstructed to be
a PED mechanism. We can exclude this scenario because it does not make sense
to make different arrangements based on an arbitrary choice between the actions
securing the same outcomes.
1.5 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of OSP Mechanisms
Now we formally define the technical conditions for the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a mechanism to be OSP.
Definition 15 (Single Continuation Property) We say D satisfies the Single
Continuation Property if for all Ii ∈ Ii, the following conditions are met:
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1. if xi is a continuation outcome at Ii, then xi is achievable by only one action
in A(Ii).
2. if xi, x
′
i are distinct continuation outcomes at Ii, and xi ∈ Xi(a), x′i ∈ Xi(a′)
for some distinct actions a, a′ ∈ A(Ii), then (xi, x′i) is convex-dominated in
Xi(Ii) ∪XGi (Ii).
Let h ∈ H, Ii ∈ Ii, we say Ii is the most recent node of h for bidder i if
1. there exists h′ ∈ Ii such that h′ ≺ h,
2. for all h′′ such that h′ ≺ h′′ ≺ h, ι(h′′) 6= i.
We say Ii is the most recent node of I
′
i if there exists h ∈ I ′i such that Ii is the most
recent node of h for i. We say an action a is the most recent action of h for i if
a ∈ ψi(h) ∩ A(Ii), where Ii is the most recent node of h for i.
Definition 16 (Disappearing Outcome) 1. Let Ii ∈ I and a be the most re-
cent action of Ii. We say xi is a disappearing outcome at Ii if xi ∈ Xi(a) and
xi /∈ Xi(Ii).
2. Let z ∈ Z, and let a be the most recent action of z. We say xi is a disappearing
outcome for bidder i at z if xi ∈ Xi(a) and χi(z) 6= xi.
3. Let XDi (Ii) and X
D
i (z) denote the sets of disappearing outcomes for Ii and z,
respectively.
Definition 17 (Persistent Exit) We say D satisfies the Persistent Exits Property
if the following conditions hold:
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1. for all Ii ∈ Ii, xgi ∈ XGi (Ii) and xdi ∈ XDi (Ii), if (xdi , x
g
i ) is convex-undominated
in Xi(Ii) ∪XGi (Ii), then x
g
i is assurable at Ii.
2. for all z ∈ Z, if XDi (z) 6= ∅, then for all xdi ∈ XDi (z) and x
g
i ∈ XGi (z), (xdi , x
g
i )
is convex-dominated by χi(z).
Theorem 9 Let D be a dynamic mechanism on market Ω, then D is OSP if and
only if D satisfies the Persistent Exit Property and the Single Continuation Property.
1.6 Chapter Conclusion
In this paper, we see that the definitions of the obviously dominant strategy
and the obvious strategy-proofness do not immediately imply strategic simplicity
in multi-dimensional and multi-unit allocation problems. To improve upon the
concept of OSP, we proposed a refined solution concept called obviously regret-
proof (ORP). ORP requires the auction rules and announcement to make it easy
for any bidder to see that whenever he is called to play, he will not regret playing
the cautiously optimistic strategy. This strategy simply tells bidders always to
pursue their most desirable achievable outcomes and to secure one of them whenever
possible. We then translated the extensive form characteristics of ORP mechanisms
into the language of auction rules and proposed its generic implementation, the PED
mechanism. We then showed that the PED mechanism is a meaningful extension of
the one-dimensional personal clock auction and the English Auction. Also, the PED
mechanism can implement any monotonic and OSP-implementable allocation rule.
Therefore, enforcing stricter simplicity requirements does not sacrifice the generality
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of the implementable allocation rules.
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Chapter 2: The Cost of Obviousness
2.1 Introduction
Market designers pursue mechanisms that have good incentive properties.
They craft the allocation and payment rules to prevent bidders from manipulat-
ing the mechanism and making mistakes. However, that also implies that we lose
some flexibility in those rules, which may reduce the welfare and the chance of trans-
actions. The impact on welfare from those restrictions may depend on the structure
of the allocation problem. Thus, whenever there is a new mechanism available, it
is important for market designers to be aware of the restrictions and the welfare
implications before fully adopting it.
In the previous chapter, we proposed both a new solution concept and a new
mechanism to reduce strategic errors and manipulation by bidders. We also ex-
tended the implementation of strategic simple mechanisms to the new domain of
multi-dimensional and multi-unit allocation problems. This raises new questions:
what do we lose from pursuing this notion of strategic simplicity? What are the
restrictions and welfare implications that are imposed on the allocation and pay-
ment rules? These questions are important for market designers to test whether
a mechanism is a good fit for a given allocation problem. Given that the multi-
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dimensional allocation problem is very general, these questions should be relevant
to many market designers.
To review, the solution concept proposed in the previous chapter is called
Obviously Regret-Proofness (ORP), which is a refinement and an improvement
upon the Obviously Strategy-proofness by Li (2017). OSP is proposed because
the dominant strategy in a strategy-proof mechanism might not be easy to compre-
hend. Moreover, strategy-proof mechanisms might not be able to prevent profitable
group deviations. Therefore, mistakes and manipulations still occur in strategy-
proof mechanisms (Rees-Jones, 2018). In an OSP mechanism, it is easier for the
bidders to verify that the dominant strategy out-performs all the others. Also, OSP
implies weak group strategy-proofness (WGSP). This means that there is no group
deviation that strictly benefits all the deviators. However, as criticized in the previ-
ous chapter, if we extend OSP mechanisms to the domain of multi-dimensional and
multi-unit allocation problems, even OSP mechanisms cannot guarantee that the
dominant strategy is easy to find and verify. Therefore, the concept of ORP was
proposed to cover the elements of strategic simplicity that are not captured in the
definition of OSP.
Concisely, an ORP mechanism is an OSP mechanism with more explicit rules
and announcements to help bidders pursue and secure their most desirable best-
case outcomes. It guarantees that there is a simple rule for each bidder to select the
optimal action whenever he is called, a rule that will instruct him to choose the action
that can achieve his most desirable achievable outcome and secure it whenever it is
possible. The ORP mechanisms have auction rules and announcements that make it
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easier for bidders to determine the best-case outcomes and the ways to secure them.
The chances to exit are persistent. Therefore a bidder will not regret forgoing these
outcomes to pursue of his most desirable ones. In short, the ORP mechanism not
only enhances the characteristics of the extensive form of a mechanism, but it also
formalizes the requirements for the way that the auctioneer should filter information
and communicate with bidders. All these efforts are designed to make it easier for
bidders to participate and verify the optimality of their actions.
The PED mechanism is a translation of extensive form characteristics of ORP
mechanisms to the language of auction rules. It is also a multi-dimensional extension
of the personal clock auctions in Milgrom and Segal (2020) and Li (2017). The
descending structure is similar—the longer the bidder stays in the mechanism, the
less desirable the outcomes offered will be. What makes them different is that in
PED mechanisms, bidders can be offered multiple ways to exit or to continue in
the auction. The persistence of exits is the key property that makes the mechanism
ORP, as it enforces a clear and predictable pattern about the availability of outcomes
that bidders had previously forgone.
Thus, compared to weakly strategy-proof (SP) mechanisms, the PED mech-
anisms are more robust to avoid bidder mistakes and manipulations. However, for
economists to make decisions, knowing the marginal benefits of using PED mech-
anisms is not enough. We also need to know the marginal costs. By marginal
costs, we mean the restrictions on the allocation rules added to the requirements for
strategy-proofness. Understanding these restrictions and their welfare implications,
we can better evaluate the trade-off between strategic simplicity and the loss of
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welfare.
In this Chapter, we study the cost of the class of “obvious” mechanisms (both
ORP, OSP). It suffices to consider the class of PED-implementable mechanisms
only. This is because all well-behaved OSP-implementable mechanisms are also
PED-implementable, as pointed out in the previous chapter. That means that even
though ORP is a stricter notion of strategic simplicity compared to OSP, there is
no loss of generality of the allocation rules it can implement.
To study the restrictions, we first establish our analytical framework by charac-
terizing all the strategy-proof mechanisms. We show that a mechanism is strategy-
proof if and only if it is a pricing mechanism. In a pricing mechanism, once the
reports of other bidders are fixed, the bidder cannot change the payments of all the
possible allocations with his own report. The mechanism then assigns the allocation
that maximizes the bidder’s payoff as if the bidder is doing so by himself given the
schedule of prices. This result is comparable to the Groves mechanism (Groves,
1973). We call this payment the pricing of the allocation. Pricing not only de-
termines the payment of an allocation contingent on being assigned, but it also
determines the allocation rule, because the higher the pricing, the more likely it be-
comes the most preferred allocation for a bidder. Thus, the payment and allocation
rule of a mechanism can be characterized by its pricing functions.
Next, we characterize the welfare-maximizing pricing mechanism, the Vickrey
(1961)-Clarke (1971)-Groves (1973) (VCG) mechanism. We treat it as a baseline
model to compare the differences in the pricing functions between the efficient ones
and the PED-implementable ones. We show that an important feature of VCG
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pricing is the mutual influence of pricing between bidders. When the values of
complementary allocations rise or the values of competing allocations fall, the pricing
should increase to encourage the bidder to choose it. Therefore, the pricing of an
allocation can reflect its marginal contribution to the welfare of the rest of the
agents. Also, this influence is mutual as both competition and complementarity are
mutual relationships.
In contrast, in PED-implementable mechanisms, the ability for other bidders
to influence the pricing is restricted and the influence is one-sided. We show that it
is inevitable that once the values of some other allocations exceed some thresholds,
the channel to influence the pricing function is be blocked. We call that region
where the influence halted the constant pricing space. Therefore, the larger the
constant pricing space of an allocation, the more inefficient the allocation becomes.
We then show that the constant pricing spaces form a hierarchical structure in the
sense that the larger ones contain the smaller ones. This makes it inevitable for
some allocations to have larger constant pricing spaces than others. Moreover, we
show that a winning bidder can exert his influence only within the constant pricing
space of his winning allocation, where his winning outcome cannot be influenced by
the bidders he can influence. That implies that mutual influence between winners
is not possible. Even though it is a restriction of the allocation rule, it also prevents
profitable group deviations. This can be considered the cost of weak group strategy-
proofness.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, in Section 2.2, we restate
the multi-dimensional and multi-unit allocation problem and the PED mechanism
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introduced in Chapter 1. Then in Section 2.3, we build the analytical foundation
by introducing the generic strategy-proof mechanism: the pricing mechanism. In
Section 2.4, we characterize VCG pricing as a baseline for us to compare with the
PED-implementable one. In Section 2.5, we present our major results. We show
for all PED-implementable mechanism the influence between bidders is restricted
and can be only one-way. We also characterize those restrictions and highlight the
trade-off between the ability to influence and being influenced.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 The Allocation Problem
The allocation problem we consider in this chapter is the same as the model
in the previous chapter. It is a problem between a non-strategic bidder and a finite
set of strategic bidders, N . The client is the agent who hires the auctioneer to host
the mechanism. He offers to each bidder i ∈ N an individualized allocation space
Yi ⊆ RKi for some Ki ∈ N. An allocation yi = (yi1, yi2, . . . , yiKi) ∈ Yi specifies a Ki
dimensional vector of goods and services assigned to bidder i. Let y0i ∈ Yi denote the
endowment allocation of bidder i. An outcome of a mechanism is a pair xi = (yi, pi),
which specifies an allocation yi ∈ Yi and a payment pi ∈ R from the client to bidder i.
The payment pi can take negative values, which means bidder i makes a net payment
of |pi| to the client. Let Xi ≡ Yi × R be the outcome spaces for bidders i ∈ N .
We assume that each bidder has a weakly convex, weakly increasing, continuous
preference on Xi that is quasi-linear in the payment pi. Let Ui be the set of utility
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functions that represent those preferences such that the endowment outcome is
normalized to zero, that is, ui(x
0
i ) = ui(y
0
i , 0). Let YN ≡ Πi∈NYi and XN ≡ Πi∈NXi
be the set of all allocation profiles and outcomes, respectively. The client specifies
a subset of allocation profiles that are feasible F ⊆ YN , and his willingness to pay
w(yN) ∈ R for each feasible allocation profile yN ∈ F . We assume that the client
is budget constrained to pay at most w(yN) for each yN ∈ F . A market is then a
tuple that summarizes all the above elements, Ω = 〈N,XN ,UN ,F , w〉.
2.2.2 The Direct Mechanism
A direct mechanism on market Ω is a pair of functions M = (αN , ρN) such
that αN : UN → F and ρN : UN → R|N |. We denote χi(uN) = (αi(uN), ρi(uN)).
A mechanism is said to be finite if the image αN(UN) is finite.
Definition 18 Let M be a direct mechanism on market Ω, we say M is strategy-
proof if, for all uN ∈ UN and all u′i ∈ Ui, we have
ui(χi(ui, u−i)) ≥ ui(χi(u′i, u−i)) (2.1)
2.2.3 The PED Mechanism
To define a PED-implementable direct mechanism, we first need to restate the
PED mechanism auction rules from Chapter 1.
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The Flow of the Auction
At t = 0, the auctioneer initializes the auction with the set of active bidders
A0 = N . At each period t ≥ 0, the auctioneer calls an active bidder i ∈ A(t)
to play. When bidder i is called to play, the auctioneer offers him two sets of
actions: (Eit, Cit). Actions in Eit are called exit actions and actions in Cit are called
continuation actions. For each action a ∈ Eit ∪Cit, the auctioneer also announces a
set of outcomes achievable by this action, XAi (a) ⊆ Xi. Bidder i observes (Eit, Cit)
and XAi (a) for all offered actions, and then submits one action ait in Eit∪Cit to the
auctioneer. Then the auction enters the next period, t+ 1.
Let XEit = ∪a∈EitXAi (a) be the set of all outcomes specified in the exit actions.
Similarly, let XCit = ∪a∈CitXAi (a) be the set of outcomes specified in the continuation
actions. Let Xit = X
C
it ∪XEit .
We require that for all exit actions, a ∈ Eit, XAi (a) is a singleton. If a ∈ Eit,
XAi (a) = {xi}, and bidder i chooses a at period t, bidder i will be assigned xi at the
end of the auction. Also, bidder i becomes inactive, that is, At+1 = At\{i}.
If bidder i chooses to continue with ait ∈ Cit, one of the following two cases
will happen in some future period t′. First, bidder i wins XAi (ait) and must secure
one of the winning outcomes in XAi (ait). If X
A
i (ait) is a singleton, then i is directly
assigned the winning outcome and will not be called to play. Otherwise, i is called
at t′, and is offered XCit = ∅ and XEit = XAi (ait). That means that, i has to choose
which one in XAi (ait) to secure. After t
′, i becomes inactive.
In the second case, the clock descends in the sense that for all x′i ∈ Xit′ , there
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exists xi ∈ Xit such that x′i ≤ xi. That is to say, each of the offered outcomes
in XAi (ait) becomes either weakly inferior or it disappears. However, in this case,
we require the exit outcomes to be persistent, XEit ⊆ XEit′ . That means that, we
allow some of the weakly descended outcomes to turn into exit outcomes. But once
they become exit outcomes, they will always be exit outcomes whenever the clock
descends.
The Requirements of the Announced Outcomes
There are a few requirements for the announced outcomes. We require that
each xi ∈ XEit is weakly undominated in Xit and that each xi ∈ XCit is undominated
in Xit. Also, we require that each of the announced outcomes in X
C
it is achievable
but nonassurable in this mechanism. This requirement implies two guidelines for
the auctioneer. First, if there is no way that an outcome can be fulfilled, it should
not be announced at all. Second, if an outcome will not descend or disappear in any
case, announce it as the exit outcome, not the continuation outcome. The purpose




Another more technical requirement is that, for all a, a′ ∈ Cit and all xi ∈
XAi (a), x
′
i ∈ XAi (a′), there exists xei ∈ XEit and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that xei ≥ λxi + (1−
λ)x′i. This condition is needed to satisfy the single continuation property defined
in Definition 15. It is necessary to guarantee that there is at most one relevant
continuation action to all types of bidders. This condition together with the strong
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persistence of exits property is sufficient to guarantee the mechanism is regret-free.
2.2.4 Verifying the PED Mechanism is Regret-Proof
In the previous chapter, we showed that the PED mechanism is obviously
regret-proof (ORP). Since we do not intend to dive into the definition of ORP, we
just verify from the bidder’s perspective that it is easy for him to choose an action
and to see the optimality of his action. We can verify this without stating the formal
definition of regret-free. We intentionally use the less formal language to verify this
condition to show the simplicity of the concept behind ORP and PED mechanisms.
The Cautiously Optimistic Strategy
When bidder i is called to play, given the announced outcomes, Xit, the bidder
first computes the most desirable announced outcomes X∗it. If some of the most
desirable outcomes are exit outcomes, the bidder could arbitrarily choose one and
select the corresponding action to secure it. Otherwise, the bidder will observe that
all his most favorite outcomes are achievable by only one continuation action in Cit,
according to Theorem 5 in Chapter 1. So, the bidder selects that action.
The Cautiously Optimistic Strategy Is Regret-free
We can verify that the strategy is regret-free. First, if i secures an exit out-
come, then the worst-case outcome of this strategy trivially equals the secured out-
come. Since it is the most preferred outcome, it is better than all other exits. Also,
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because the clock only descends, there is no way he can get a more desirable out-
come by choosing to continue. Therefore, he will not regret choosing to secure this
outcome. Next, if the bidder chooses to continue, then whenever any of his fantasy
outcomes in X∗it becomes unachievable, the previously available exits will again be
assurable. Therefore, the worst-case to happen is that he chooses one of the exits
in some future period. Therefore, the worst-case payoff of following this strategy is
not worse than the best-case payoff of any other deviation. Therefore, the bidder
will not regret pursuing his most desirable outcomes.
2.2.5 PED-Implementability
In this paper, our focus is on the direct mechanisms that can be imple-
mented by a PED mechanism. Formally, a direct mechanism is said to be PED-
implementable if there exist a PED mechanism D and a cautiously optimistic strat-
egy Si for all ui ∈ Ui and i ∈ N such that χN(h∅, SN) = χN(uN).
2.3 The Pricing Mechanism
Let Yi(u−i) ≡ αi(Ui, u−i) denote the set of possible allocation to i when other
bidders report u−i.
Definition 19 Let M be a direct mechanism on market Ω. We say M is a pricing
mechanism if for all i ∈ N , there exists a pricing function Pi : Yi × U−i → R such
that for all uN ∈ UN
1. αi(uN) ∈ arg max{ui(y′i, Pi(y′i, u−i))|y′i ∈ Yi(u−i)}.
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2. ρi(uN) = Pi(αi(uN), u−i).
In this case, we say M is supported by the pricing function PN .
Theorem 10 Let M be a finite mechanism. Then M is strategy-proof if and only
if M is a pricing mechanism.
Given a pricing mechanism M , let Xi(u−i) ≡ {(yi, Pi(yi, u−i))|yi ∈ Yi(u−i)} be
the set of outcomes available to bidder i for a given report profile from the rest of
the bidders.
Lemma 4 Let M be a finite pricing mechanism. Then M is ex-post individual
rational if and only if for all uN ∈ UN and all i ∈ N , there exists xi ∈ Xi(u−i) such
that xi ≥ x0i .
2.4 VCG Pricing as the Baseline
In this section, we characterize the Vickrey (1961)-Clarke (1971)-Groves (1973)
(VCG) mechanism and the associated VCG pricing functions. Then we characterize
the mutual and monotonic influence between bidders in VCG pricing functions.
2.4.1 The VCG Pricing Mechanism
The VCG mechanism is a mechanism that implements the efficient allocation
rule by internalizing a bidder’s marginal effect to total welfare into his payment rule.
Therefore, the optimal choice of this bidder is align with the optimal choice for the
economy. We formalize this concept as follows.
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First, we decompose ui into ui(yi, pi) = vi(yi) + pi. The term vi(yi) can be
considered as the value of an allocation yi. The total welfare is the sum of values of
the bidders and the client
W (yN , uN) =
∑
i∈N
vi(yi) + w(yN) (2.2)
An allocation rule αN is said to be efficient if it maximizes the total welfare
among the feasible allocations at all uN ∈ UN . That is
αN(uN) ∈ arg max{W (y′N , uN)|y′N ∈ F} (2.3)
We now formalize this payment rule, which should take into account the







N)|y′i = yi, y′N ∈ F} be the maximal welfare from the rest of
the agents given that bidder i is assigned yi. Then the marginal effect of i being as-
signed yi instead of not participating can be characterized by Vi(yi, u−i)−Vi(y0i , u−i),
which is payment rule for the VCG mechanism.
Definition 20 (The VCG Mechanism) A mechanism M = (αN , ρN) is said to
be a VCG mechanism on market Ω if αN is efficient and for all i ∈ N , ui ∈ Ui, we
have
ρi(uN) = Vi(αi(uN), u−i)− Vi(y0i , u−i) (2.4)
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The following theorem confirms that the VCG mechanism is strategy-proof
and ex-post individual rational.
Theorem 11 A VCG mechanism M = (αN , ρN) is strategy-proof, ex-post individ-
ual rational and efficient. Also, M is supported by the following pricing function:
Pi(yi, u−i) = Vi(yi, u−i)− Vi(y0i , u−i) (2.5)
for each i ∈ N , yi ∈ Yi(u−i) and u−i ∈ U−i.
2.4.2 Monotonic and Mutual Influence of VCG Pricing
We can observe a notion of monotonicity in VCG pricing. In the RHS of
Equation (2.5), pricing is increasing with Vi(yi, u−i) and decreasing with Vi(y
0
i , u−i).
Roughly speaking, the bidder will be encouraged with higher pricing to choose yi if
the value of the complementary allocations gets higher; and he will be discouraged
with lower pricing if the competing allocation has a higher value. We now formalize
this monotonicity concept.
First, we define the order on the preference set Ui based on how the preference
value a particular outcome xi ∈ Xi. Intuitively, xi is more valuable in preference ui
than in u′i if xi is preferred to a larger set of outcomes. Define ui ≥xi u′i if for all
pi ∈ R, the upper contour set of xi is smaller for ui, that is
{x′i ∈ Xi|ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi)} ⊆ {x′i ∈ Xi|u′i(x′i) ≥ u′i(xi)}. (2.6)
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Because all the preferences in Ui are quasi-linear, the shape of the upper con-
tour sets will be the same for all outcomes with the same allocation yi. Thus, if the
upper contour set of xi = (xi, pi) is smaller in ui than in u
′
i, then the upper contour
set of other x′i = (yi, p
′
i) also is smaller.




Thus, what we are really comparing is the relative value of vi(yi). With this
property, we can define ui ≥yi u′i if there exists xi = (yi, pi) ∈ Xi such that ui ≥xi u′i.
Lemma 6 If ui ≥yi u′i, then for all y′i ∈ Yi, we have vi(yi)− vi(y′i) ≥ v′i(yi)− v′i(y′i).
In particular, when y′i = y
0
i , we have vi(yi) ≥ v′i(yi).
We now define what we mean by complementary and competing allocation.






N)|y′i = yi, y′N ∈ F}. We say y′N
is a complementary allocation to yi at u−i if y
′
N ∈ α∗N(yi, u−i). We say y′N is a
substitutable allocation to yi at u−i if y
′
N ∈ α∗N(y0i , u−i).
Theorem ?? states that in a VCG mechanism, the pricing function is mono-
tonic:
Theorem 12 If M is a VCG mechanism, then for all i ∈ N , u−i ∈ U−i and
yi ∈ Yi(u−i),
1. if y′N is a complementary allocation to yi at u−i, then for all u
′
−i ∈ U−i such
that u′j ≥y′j uj for all j 6= i, we have Pi(yi, u
′
−i) ≥ Pi(yi, u−i).
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2. if y′N is a substitutable allocation to yi at u−i, then for all u
′
−i ∈ U−i such that
u′j ≥y′j uj for all j 6= i, we have Pi(yi, u
′
−i) ≤ Pi(yi, u−i).
This result states that in an efficient mechanism, there are two types of influ-
ence on the pricing of an allocation: one from the complementary allocation and one
from the competing allocation. Because the reports of other bidders can influence
the pricing of an allocation, the price can reflect the marginal effect of a bidder’s
choice and guide the bidder to make an efficient choice.
2.5 Restricted Influence in PED-Implementable Mechanisms
In this section, we show that for a pricing mechanism, to be PED-implementable,
the ability of pricing functions to adjust according to the values of other bidders
is restricted. We show that it is inevitable for the winning allocations to have a
constant pricing space. This means that the pricing of an allocation cannot change
after the values of other allocations from other bidders exceed some certain thresh-
olds. Even though we may wish that the restrictive area is small, however, we show
that there exists a hierarchy of these constant pricing spaces across bidders, and,
therefore, it is inevitable for some allocations to have larger spaces than others. Or
more precisely, if some allocation has a small constant pricing space, then there must
exist a larger constant pricing space for other allocations of other bidders. Also, we
show that a winning bidder can exert influence only in the constant pricing space of
his winning outcome. That implies that if the value of an allocation can influence
the pricing of other allocation, then the pricing itself cannot be influenced. Thus,
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there is a trade-off between influencing others and being influenced.
2.5.1 Constant Pricing Spaces
The Threshold Space
We first characterize the constant pricing space as a threshold space. The
intuition behind a threshold space is that it collects all preferences where the value
of some specified allocations exceed certain thresholds. Formally, given i ∈ N ,









finite subsets of Xi. Given a threshold τi, define x
∗
i (τi, ui) ≡ arg max{ui(xi)|xi ∈
XCi ∪XEi }. Define the one-dimensional threshold space supported by τi as:
Ui(τi) = {ui ∈ Ui|x∗i (τi, ui) ⊆ XCi } (2.7)
That is, ui is collected if it values some allocation in X
C
i high enough so that
ui prefers this outcome to all others in X
C
i ∪XEi . We can define an N-dimensional
threshold space from the product of one-dimensional ones. Let uN ∈ UN , S ⊆ N ,
and τi for i ∈ S such that ui ∈ Ui(τi) for all i ∈ S. Define the N -dimensional
threshold space as:
UN(uN , τS) = Πi/∈S{ui} × Πi∈SUi(τi) (2.8)
The following lemma highlights the threshold property. Intuitively, the lemma




i ), if ui values xi ∈ XCi high enough such
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that xi is the most preferred outcome in X
C
i ∪XEi , then all the preferences u′i that
value xi more than ui are also included in the threshold space Ui(τi).
Lemma 7 Suppose ui ∈ Ui(τi), let xi ∈ x∗i (τ, ui). Then for all u′i ≥xi ui, we have
u′i ∈ Ui(τi).
The following lemma builds the connection between the threshold space and
the PED mechanisms. It says that the set of preferences that choose to continue in
a cautiously optimistic strategy is a threshold space. That is because ui chooses to
continue with ait ∈ XCit only if all of his most preferred achievable outcomes are in
ait.
Lemma 8 Let D be a PED mechanism. For any given u−i ∈ U−i, let U ′i(u−i) ⊆ Ui
be the set of preferences such that
1. the profile (ui, u−i) reaches period t if everyone plays a cautiously optimistic
strategy,
2. ui chooses to continue with some continuation action ait ∈ XCit with a cau-
tiously optimistic strategy,
Then U ′i is a threshold space with threshold τi = (ait, XEit ), that is, U ′i(u−i) = Ui(τi)
Constant Pricing Space
The constant pricing space is a threshold space where an allocation yi has a
fixed pricing. Formally, a threshold space UN(uN , τS) is said to be a constant pricing
space for xi at uN if Pi(yi, ·) = pi on UN(uN , τS).
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In contrast to the monotonicity property in the VCG mechanism, if yi has a
constant pricing space Ui(uN , τS), then it means that once the values of allocations
in XCj are higher than the specified threshold, then the pricing of yi becomes a
constant and no longer adjusts according to the values of other bidders. This is
particularly restrictive if XCj contains some complementary or competing outcomes
because efficient pricing should increase with the values of complementary allocation,
and decrease with the values of competing allocations.
As a constant pricing space is restrictive, we may wish it to be small, if it
has to exist. The following lemma shows the conditions to have smaller threshold
spaces. Intuitively, the threshold space is small means that only a small subset of
Ui prefers outcomes in XCi to the ones in XEi . That happens when the outcomes in
XCi are not desirable and the set X
E
i is large.








i ) such that
1. for all xci ∈ XCi , there exists x̂ci ∈ X̂Ci such that x̂ci ≥ xci .
2. XEi ⊇ X̂Ei
Then Ui(τ) ⊆ Ui(τ̂).
Thus, we can define τi ≤ τ̂ if the two conditions in Lemma 9 are met. Then
we can generalize this concept to an N-dimensional threshold spaces. The following
result says that a N-dimensional threshold space is smaller if the set of bidders
regulated by the threshold is smaller, and each of the thresholds in effect also is
smaller.
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Lemma 10 Let UN(uN , τS) and UN(uN , τ̂Ŝ) be two threshold spaces. If S ⊆ Ŝ and
τi ≤ τ̂i for all i ∈ S, then UN(uN , τi) ⊆ UN(uN , τ̂Ŝ).
Now we present the main result. The following theorem says that even though
we wish that the constant pricing space were small if it has to exit, the existence
and the size of the constant pricing spaces are regulated by a hierarchical structure.
Theorem 13 (Hierarchy of Constant Pricing) If M is PED-implementable, then
for all uN ∈ UN and i ∈ N , there exists a subset of outcomes X̄i(uN) ⊆ Xi(u−i) and
constant pricing spaces, denoted UN(xi, uN) for all xi ∈ X̄i(uN) such that:
1. χi(uN) ∈ X̄i(uN) for all i ∈ N .
2. There is a reordering on ∪i∈NX̄i(uN) = {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(k)} such that UN(x(1), uN) ⊇
UN(x(2), uN) ⊇ · · · ⊇ UN(x(k), uN).
3. For i ∈ N and xi ∈ ∪j∈NX̄j(uN), if UN(xi, uN) = UN(uN , τS), and xi = x(n),
then for all j 6= i
(a) if j ∈ S, then XEj = {x(m) ∈ X̄j(uN)|m < n}.
(b) if j ∈ S, then for all xj ∈ Xj(u−j)\XEj , there exists xcj ∈ XCj such that
xcj ≥ xj.
(c) if j /∈ S, then χj(uN) = x(m) for some m < n.
The theorem says several things. First, it is inevitable that the constant pricing
spaces exist for all the assigned allocations. Second, the constant pricing spaces are
hierarchical in the sense that the larger ones contain the smaller ones. So, the higher
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the constant pricing space in the hierarchy, the larger the set XCj must be in the
thresholds τj for j ∈ S, and therefore the larger the constant pricing space. Third,
having small constant pricing spaces come at the cost of having larger ones for other
allocations. If the constant pricing space of yi is small because X
E
j is large, then
there exist constant pricing spaces for each xej ∈ XEj , and all of them are larger in
the hierarchy. If the constant pricing space is small because the S is small, this
implies that there are larger ones for all the assigned outcomes for j /∈ S. In short,
with this hierarchical structure of constant pricing spaces, it is inevitable to have
large threshold spaces that restrict the pricing of the allocations.
The intuition behind this result is that the constant pricing space for each xi
is the subset U ′j ⊆ Uj, which chooses to continue when xi is announced to be an exit
outcome. Because by Lemma 8, U ′j is a threshold space, and once xi is announced
to be an exit outcome, any variation within U ′j cannot change the payment of yi
anymore. Because in the evolution of the announcements, the exit outcomes are
persistent.
The following example shows the connection between constant pricing spaces
and implementing PED mechanisms, and why constant pricing spaces are inefficient.
Example 5 Consider that there is a seller who has two objects, A and B, to sell.
There are two bidders, N = {1, 2}. Each of them demands either A or B, that is
Yi = {y0i = (0, 0), yAi = (1, 0), yBi = (0, 1)}.
In a PED mechanism, we can initially offer both types of outcomes as con-
tinuation outcomes: Eit = {a0i } where a0i = {x0i }, and Cit = {ati}, where ait =
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{(yAi , pAit), (yBi , pBit)}. That means, when bidder i is called to play, he can either
choose a0i to exit and secure x
0
i , or he can choose to continue. According to the
auction rules, the next time he is called, either he wins and is forced to choose one
outcome from ait, or the outcomes in ait become inferior and he will be offered the
chance to secure x0i .
However, it is not possible for the auctioneer to close the auction with both
allocations still offered as continuation outcomes for both bidders. This is because
we cannot prevent both bidders from simultaneously choosing conflicting allocations,








2t)). Therefore, the auctioneer either needs to
remove some of them or convert some of them to exit outcomes. One way to do










2 ) to be exit outcomes
for both bidders. That is, Eit = {a0i , aBi } where aBi = {xBi } and Cit = {ait} where
ait = {(yAi , pAit)}. Then the pit can be interpreted as the clock price. If both of
them choose to continue, then the auctioneer iteratively lowers the clock prices, pAit
of yA1 and y
A
2 . This way, when one bidder exits, he either chooses to be assigned
his endowment x0i or good B, x
B
i . Either way, we can force the remaining bidder to




it). Thus we can prevent conflicts.
The cost of doing this is that we need to fix the pricing for yB1 and y
B
2 before we
know the preferences of the two bidders. Since yB1 and y
B
2 are competing allocations,
in an efficient mechanism, the pricing of yB1 and y
B
2 should decrease with each other
when the values of these two allocations are high enough. However, when we set
xBi as an exit outcome, we create a constant pricing space for x
B
i . Then the value
of his opponent cannot influence the pricing of yBi in this constant pricing space.
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Therefore, the allocation of yBi will be less efficient.
2.5.2 No Mutual Influence
Now we show that there is no mutual influence in PED-implementable mecha-
nisms. That is, if the value of yi can affect the availability or the pricing of yj, then
the pricing of yi itself cannot be affected by the value of yj.
Let UN(yS, uN\S) ≡ {u′N ∈ UN |αS(u′N) = yS, u′j = uj ∀j /∈ S}
Definition 21 Given uN ∈ UN , we say yi has winner influence over yj ∈ Yj(u−j)
at uN if ui ∈ Ui(yi, u−i), and there exists u′i ∈ Ui(yi, u−i) such that
1. yj /∈ Yj(u′i, u−ij), or
2. Pj(yj, u
′
i, u−ij) 6= Pj(yj, ui, u−ij).
Theorem 14 Let M be a PED-implementable direct mechanism. Suppose S ⊆ N
and i ∈ S, uN ∈ UN , χN(uN) = xN = (yN , pN). If yi has winner influence over yj
for the rest of j ∈ S, then there exists a constant pricing space UN(xi, uN) for xi at
uN such that UN(yS, u−N\S) ⊆ UN(xi, uN)
The take away from this result is that there is no mutual influence in PED-
implementable mechanisms. If we consider a special case where S = {i, j}, then the
theorem would state that if yi has influence over the availability or the pricing of
yj, then the value of yj cannot influence the pricing of yi. Since all the influence is
one-directional, if bidder i can improve the payoff of bidder j, then bidder j cannot
improve the payoff of bidder i. In contrast, in a VCG mechanism, the influence
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works both ways. When goods are complements, the mutual influence creates room
for profitable deviation. Thus, the restriction on mutual influence can be interpreted
as the cost of preventing group deviation, or the cost of enforcing WGSP.
This result also highlights the trade-off between influencing others and being
influenced. If the value of yi can affect the pricing of a large set of allocations, then
it has to imply that it has a large constant pricing space. This would mean that
the pricing function for yi itself is more restrictive. This can be considered the cost
of having influence. With this result, the hierarchy of constant pricing also can be
interpreted as a hierarchy of the ability to influence. As the constant pricing space
becomes larger, it asserts more influence, but the assignment of this allocation also
becomes less efficient.
2.6 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter showed that the persistence of exits is a double-edged sword.
On the one hand, it guarantees that the PED mechanism is strategically simple,
but it causes the allocation rule to be less efficient. It limits the ability of the
values of a bidder to influence the pricing of other bidders. While this ability is
what makes the VCG mechanism efficient. We also showed that it is inevitable that
some allocations will have larger constant pricing spaces than others. The hierarchy
of constant pricing spaces resembles the sequential order in which these outcomes
become exit offers in the PED mechanism. Finally, there is a trade-off between
the ability to influence and the ability to be influenced. The greater influence an
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allocation has, the less it can be influenced, and hence the less efficient its assignment
becomes. Market designers who are evaluating whether the PED mechanism is a
good fit should first consider whether the hierarchy of constant pricing spaces makes
the allocation rule too undesirable.
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Chapter 3: Obviously Regret-Proof Combinatorial Land Assembly
3.1 Introduction
Land assembly is a process in which developers gain ownership of multiple
contiguous parcels of land to create one larger tract. It is particularly valuable when
the structures on the smaller parcels are too depreciated and fragmented to support
the growth of a city. In such cases, replacing those structures with bigger and more
modern ones is often a better utilization of scarce urban land resources. (Brooks
and Lutz, 2016)
However, the complementarity among the owners makes it difficult to reach a
transaction through the decentralized multilateral bargaining (Menezes and Pitch-
ford, 2004; Miceli and Segerson, 2012; Kominers and Weyl, 2012b). Once we have a
target set to assemble, we need to acquire consent from all the owners. In that case,
each owner has a form of monopoly power and has the incentive to hold out—to
delay entering the negotiation—in order to get a higher surplus. Thus, multilat-
eral and sequential negotiation becomes costly and time consuming. Expecting this
problem, the developer may be deterred from entering the market in the first place,
or he may exit the bargaining early once he realizes someone is holding out.
Can centralized market mechanisms be used to solve the holdout problem?
76
In a centralized mechanism, we have a structured process to aggregate information
about bidders’ value to the auctioneer. Therefore, we can avoid the time-consuming,
back-and-forth process between the developer and the owners. The literature doc-
uments the ways that market designers attempted land assembly (Kominers and
Weyl, 2012b,a; Plassmann and Tideman, 2007, 2010). However, those mechanisms
are restrictive in the sense that they fail to address the some fundamental features
of the land assembly problem.
First, those mechanisms are restricted to use unanimity rules. It means that
the auctioneer is exogenously given a target set to assemble, such that either the
transaction occurs for everyone in the set or no transaction at all. However, there are
many other buildings in the neighborhood and therefore many subsets of contiguous
buildings. The unanimity rule is restricting the developer to only try to reach a deal
with a particular one. It is restrictive because we lose the opportunity to discover
transaction possibilities with other subsets. In particular, the larger sets will less
likely to be chosen, because the probability of trade decreases sharply as the number
of bidders increases (Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990).
Second, these mechanisms overlooked the importance of non-monetary com-
pensations. It is very common in land assembly practice that the land owners are
offered newly built apartments as non-monetary compensations. This is because get-
ting cash payments does not settle down the where-to-live problem for the owners.
When home owners are deciding whether to sell their properties to the developer,
they will also consider the cost and the location of their next home if they do. If
the developer can offer them a new apartment in the new building, then not only
77
it is an upgrade of their homes, but it also implies that they can stay in the same
neighborhood. This is good for the developer, too. Because having a set of initial
buyers of the new building also reduces the uncertainty in sales in the future. Thus,
the probability of reaching a deal and the surplus of a transaction would increase
if we allow this type of property exchange. However, the challenge for having non-
monetary compensation is that the outcome space must be multi-dimensional, as
there is more than one good to be allocated. Moreover, if the new apartments come
with different sizes and design, then the dimensionality increases.
Third, these mechanisms are not strategically simple. Because most of the
participants will be small home owners who have little to no experience in game
theories and auctions. It is also not likely for them to hire auction consultants
during the auction. Thus, even if we carefully craft the allocation and payment
rules to induce them to tell the truth, they may fail to understand the rules and
solve for the equilibrium strategy. Then the auctioneer cannot really implement the
intended allocation and payment rules.
Finally, some of the mechanisms compromise the individual rationality or the
property right protection (Kominers and Weyl, 2012b; Plassmann and Tideman,
2010). The motivation is to increase the efficiency of the mechanism under the
unanimity rule. But given that the stake is high, enforcing the outcome that is
worse than the status quo inevitably involves some government power, which can
be controversial.
In this chapter, we aim to propose market design solutions that address all
the above problems. We show that the Persistent Exit Descending (PED) mech-
78
anism we developed in the first chapter is a good candidate. It implements the
combinatorial allocation rule on a multi-dimensional, multi-unit outcome space. It
is obviously regret-proof, which means that it is easy for a bidder to find and under-
stand the dominant strategy. Plus, the ex-post individual rationality can be easily
enforced. What we need to do is just clean up some nonessential features and sim-
plify it for land assembly problems. We show that for the feasibility structure in
land assembly problems, the coexistence of multiple exit outcomes and continuation
outcomes is not meaningful and creates fairness concerns. Therefore, we introduce
the degenerated version of the PED mechanism that is tailored to the land assembly
problem.
The analytical framework in chapter 2 also provides a tool for us to understand
the limitation of using this mechanism. First, we show that the mutual influence
is completely shut down between winners. Second, the mechanism is not flexible
for bidders who own more than one apartment. Given the reports of other bidders,
the mechanism can only determine whether to clear a fixed set of his properties.
Finally, we also address that the combinatorial allocation rule does not fully escape
the Impossibility theorem by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). For a given target
set, the probability to clear that set is still low if the number of bidders in the set
is large. Thus, if we are dealing with buildings with a large number of owners, then
we would not expect the probability of a trade to be much higher.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present
the land assembly allocation problem, which is slightly modified from the multi-
dimensional and multi-unit allocation problem. Next, in Section 3.3, we introduce
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the degenerated PED mechanism, and we explain why we need this simplified and
seemingly more restrictive version. In Section 3.4, we show by example how the
degenerated PED mechanism works in different types of transactions, and the ad-
vantages of using them in land assembly problems. In Section 3.5, we show by
examples the restrictions of using PED mechanisms and the challenges for it really
to be implemented in the real world.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Allocation Problem
We consider a market with a real estate developer and a finite set of bidders.
The bidders can be apartment owners or some people who want to buy the to-be-
developed apartments. For simplicity, we assume that there is no co-ownership in
this model. That is, each apartment is owned by one owner. However, it is possible
that one bidder may own multiple apartments. We also allow that in some buildings,
only a subset of the apartment owners participate in the mechanism. This implies
that it is not possible to clear those buildings. However, their participation can be
meaningful since their apartments could be on the market for the owners in other
clearable buildings. Some of these owners may prefer those existing apartments over
the new ones. We assume that the real estate developer is non-strategic, and all the
information he submits to the auctioneer is authentic.
Let N be a finite set of bidders. Suppose that for all i ∈ N , there exists
a set of apartments Ki that i owns and puts on the market. Let K
E = ∪i∈NKi
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denote the entire set of apartments on the market. Ki = ∅ implies that i has no
endowed properties or he is not willing to sell his properties. He participates in
this mechanism just to buy some apartments. A clearable building B is a building
where all its apartments are on the market, that is B ⊆ KE. Let B denote the set
of clearable buildings. Notice that we do not require ∪B = KE, because even if
apartment k ∈ KE is in a non-clearable building, we could have a transaction where
some owners in the cleared building move to existing apartment k and the original
owner of k gets a newly built one of type k′ ∈ KN .
If the developer clears a subset of the buildings, then he can tear down the
old structures and build new ones on the plot of land where the old ones stand.
Suppose that the developer can build a finite set of types of new apartments, KN .
The type is an abstraction of the heterogeneity of the newly built properties, which
can represent apartments with different numbers of bedrooms and bathrooms, on
different floors, etc. In addition, within each type, the sizes of the apartments might
differ. That is, within the type, One-Bedroom on the Terrace Level, it is possible
for the developer to build 1,200 ft2 ones and 1,000 ft2 ones.
For each k ∈ KE ∪KN , let yik specify the ownership for apartment k that is
allocated to bidder i. If k ∈ KE, then yik ∈ {0, 1}, where yik = 1 if and only if
i gains ownership of the existing apartment k. If k ∈ KN , then yik ∈ R denotes
the total size of the new apartment of type k that i gets. If i is assigned 2 units of
1,000 ft2 One-Bedroom apartments, then yik = 2, 000. Then an allocation for i is a
profile of ownership yi = (yik) for all k ∈ KE ∪KN . Let y0i denote the endowment
of i before the auction starts. Let Yi be the set of all possible allocations. Let
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yN = (yi)i∈N denote the allocation for all bidders. An apartment k ∈ KE is said to
be cleared in yN if it is not assigned to any bidder. That is, yik = 0 for all i ∈ N .
A clearable building B is said to be cleared in yN if all of its apartments k ∈ B are
cleared.
An allocation is feasible if the demand for an apartment is less or equal to
the supply of the apartment. For the existing apartments, it is straightforward to
require that
∑
i∈N yik ≤ 1. For the new apartments, the supply is more flexible, as
the developer might be able to customize the design for a new building based on
the demand elicited in the mechanism. Nevertheless, the feasibility of a demand
profile is still expected to depend on the set of cleared buildings. The more pieces of
land that are cleared, the larger the new buildings can be and the more flexible the
supply can be. Because it is not our purpose in this paper to address the technology
of land assembly, we abstract this layer away by assuming that the developer has
submitted a set F ⊆ YN containing all the feasible allocation profiles.
An outcome for i is the combination of an allocation and a payment from the
developer to bidder i, that is xi = (yi, pi) ∈ Yi × R. We allow pi < 0, which means
the net payment is made from i to the developer. This can happen when bidder i
is buying some new apartments from the developer.
Assume that each bidder i ∈ N has a linear preference over the outcome
space. That is, for each k ∈ KE ∪ KN , there exists vik ∈ R, such that the utility
function evaluated at outcome xi = (yi, pi) is given by ui(xi) = ui(yi, pi) =
∑
k(yik−
yik)vik + pi = (yi − y0i ) · vi + pi. If k ∈ KE, vik can be interpreted as the monetary






ikvik to normalize the utility, such that ui(x
0
i ) = 0.
Let Fi(vi) = Pr(v
′
ik ≤ vik|k ∈ KE ∪ KN) be the joint cumulative distribution
function.
3.3 The Mechanism
We introduce the degenerated version of the PED mechanism. In a full PED
mechanism, bidders may have multiple continuation actions and exit actions to
choose from in each period. However, in this degenerated version, each bidder
has only one continuation action and one exit action unless he is forced to exit.
The reasons for using this restricted version are feasibility and simplicity. That
is, concerning feasibility, the full version does not provide much additional value
than this degenerated version. Therefore, to make it simple for bidders and for
the auctioneer, we use the degenerated version. We will revisit this point after we
introduce the mechanism.
3.3.1 Auction Rule
The auction is initialized with t = 0 and the set of active bidders A(0) = N .
At each t ≥ 0, the auctioneer call an active bidder in A(t) to play. The auctioneer
offers to this bidder a set of outcomes Xit ⊆ Xi and tells him whether the auction
is closing for i. If the mechanism is closing for i at t, then bidder i has to choose
one outcome xi from the offered set Xit. He will be assigned the outcome xi he has
chosen at the end of the auction. The auction continues with A(t + 1) = A(t)\{i}.
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This means that bidder i is no longer active and will not be called to play in future
periods. We require that the auctioneer not to offer outcomes that dominates one
another. That is, for all xi, x
′
i ∈ Xit, neither xi ≥ x′i nor x′i ≥ xi. If the mechanism
is closing for i at t, and t is the first period i is called to play, then we require that
x0i ∈ Xit. Therefore, bidder i has the chance to keep his endowment. If t is not
closing for i, then bidder i can choose either to continue or to exit. If i chooses to
exit, then he becomes inactive and will be assigned his endowment outcome x0i at
the end of the auction. The auction enters the next period with A(t+1) = A(t)\{i}.
If bidder i chooses to continue, then the auction continues with A(t + 1) = A(t).
When bidder i is called to play next time in some t′ > t, the new offered outcomes
is regulated by the following rules:
1. If t′ is not closing, then the offered outcomes become inferior: for all x′i ∈ Xit′ ,
there exists xi ∈ Xit such that xik ≥ x′ik for all ki ∈ KE ∪KN .
2. If t′ is closing, then Xit′ = Xit.
The auction concludes at T when all bidders have exited. That is, A(T ) = ∅.
For notational convenience, if i is not called to play at t, and t′ is the last period i
is called to play, then set Xit = Xit′ .
Proposition 1 The degenerated PED mechanism is a PED mechanism.
Notice that for all active bidders i ∈ A(t), the auctioneer can always force i to
exit to x0i by removing all outcomes in Xit. This would happen when some bidder j
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in the same building chooses to keep his apartment, making it meaningless for the
developer to clear i’s apartment.
On the other hand, the auctioneer can also prevent bidder i from choosing x0i
by closing the auction for him. This happens when the auctioneer is in the process
of clearing a building. When some owners have already chosen to clear their houses,
or have even been promised a new apartment, then the auctioneer should also clear
all the other owners in the same building. In that case, we should not allow those
bidders to choose x0i anymore. Thus, the auctioneer should let them chooses only
the outcomes in Xit. Of course, the auctioneer should initiate the clearing process
only when all the owners have chosen to continue in the most recent period before
t, and all the outcomes in Xit requires i to clear his apartments in the building.
3.3.2 Reasons for the Degenerated Version
In a clearable building, clearing an apartment in that building is meaningful
only if all the other owners also clear theirs. If any of them choose to keep their
apartments, then it would be meaningless for other bidders in the building to clear
theirs. Therefore, when a rejection occurs, the auctioneer should be able to remove
the outcomes that require an owner to clear his apartments. Thus, those outcomes
are not suitable to be exit outcomes, as exit outcomes cannot be removed once
offered. Even though it is possible to offer coexisting exit and continuation outcomes
to only one bidder in a building, having a single bidder that is treated differently
may raise fairness concerns.
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In addition, if we do not have coexisting exit outcomes, then we cannot have
more than one continuation offer either. Because we need an exit outcome to convex-
dominate the continuation outcomes in different continuation actions. Thus, for
simplicity, we just remove the possibility for coexisting exit and continuation offers
and multiple continuation actions altogether.
3.4 The Advantages of PED-LA
We will use several examples to demonstrate the advantages of using the PED
mechanism for land assembly problems.
3.4.1 Exploring Trading Possibilities
The following example highlights the advantage of the combinatorial allocation
rule over the unanimity rule. To focus only on the combinatorial nature of the
problem, we first shut down the multi-option feature of this mechanism. Then this
model collapses to the binary allocation problem discussed in Milgrom and Segal
(2017) and Li (2017).
Example 6 (The Power of the Combinatorial Allocation Rule) Suppose that
there is one row of M contiguous old buildings to be redeveloped. Each building
contains one apartment. Each apartment is owned by a distinct owner. Thus,
N = {1, . . . ,M}. For simplicity, we assume that only monetary compensations
are offered in this example. Therefore, no new apartment is on the market KN = ∅.
Let Ki = {ki}, where ki denotes the apartment i owns. Then the allocation set con-
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tains only 2 elements, Yi = {y0i , yi}, where y0i is the allocation to keep his endowed
apartment, y0ik = 1 if k = ki, y
0
ik = 0 otherwise; and yi denotes that i clears his
apartment and gets no other apartments, yi = (0, . . . , 0).
Let viki be the value for i to his apartment, which is uniformly distributed in
[0, 1]. Given an outcome xi = (yi, pi), the utility of i is given by ui(xi) = ui(yi, pi) =
vi · (yi − y0i ) + pi = −vik + pi.
Suppose that there is a minimal clearing target m for the developer. That is,
the developer should clear at least m consecutive buildings. Otherwise, the acquired
land will be too small for him to build anything and the cleared buildings have no
value to him. If the developer clears n ≥ m contiguous buildings, then he gets the
value of nv̄, for some constant v̄ ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that he needs only one set of
contiguous buildings.
In a unanimity-rule-only mechanism, the auctioneer is given a fixed subset of
n ≤ M participants with contiguous buildings. The mechanism proceeds as follows.
The auctioneer calls each bidder i in turn to play and offers him Xit = {(yi, v̄)}. If
anyone chooses to exit, then the auctioneer forces everyone else to exit as well. If
everyone has chosen to continue, then the auctioneer closes for all bidders with Xit
unchanged. This is equivalent to offering a contingent take-it-or-leave-it offer (yi, v̄)
to every bidder, such that the offer is valid if and only if everyone accepts it.
We now calculate the expected welfare for this mechanism. Given that i accepts
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(yi, v̄), the conditional expected welfare is
E(uj(yi, v̄)|vik ≤ v̄) (3.1)





The net welfare that the developer gets is 0, as he pays full nv̄ to all bidders. Then
the total conditional expected welfare is n
2
v̄. The probability for the transaction




. Thus, the total expected welfare is 1
2
nv̄n+1. It should be
straightforward for readers to verify that if n
n+1








That means that, when n is large enough, even though the welfare conditioned
on a successful transaction is increasing with n, the probability of having a successful
transaction drops faster than the welfare increases. Therefore, the total welfare
decreases with n when n is sufficiently large.
Also, the welfare drops to zero as n gets large, as predicted by Mailath and
Postlewaite (1990). This implies that when we have a large clearing target, the
probability of having a successful transaction is inevitably small for a given set of
bidders.
However, if we release ourselves from the restriction of the unanimity rule,
then if somebody rejects, we can still try to reach a deal with other subsets of bidders.
88
The probability of having no trade will drop as the number of participants increases
and the number of subsets increases. To see this point, we can offer the same
outcome, Xit = {(yi, v̄)}, to all the M bidders. Then find the largest number m̄
of consecutive bidders who choose to continue. If m̄ ≥ n, then close the auction
with these bidders. Otherwise, force everyone to quit. Then for any given clearing
target n, the probability of having no consecutive n bidders to continue drops to 0
when M gets large.
Thus, in a combinatorial-allocation-rule mechanism, we mitigate the low prob-
ability problem indicated by the impossibility theorem by considering more ways to
trade. In contrast to the impossibility theorem, the more bidders that participate,
the higher the probability for a transaction to occur. This is possible only when we
adopt combinatorial allocation rules.
Also note that the combinatorial allocation rule mentioned in this example is
not welfare-maximizing. This simple rule is used to highlight the difference between
unanimity and combinatorial rules.
One caveat of this example is that we do not see the role of the descending
process in the mechanism. In the following example, we will see how the descending
process helps to explore the possibilities of transactions and facilitates competition.
Example 7 Consider the pure monetary compensation model as in Example 6, with
M = 3, N = {1, 2, 3}, and the clearing threshold m̄ = 2. Suppose the developer gets
w2 if he gets 2 contiguous buildings and w3 for 3 contiguous buildings. For all other




w3 ≥ 12w2: We can consecutively offer bidders Xit = {(yi,
1
3
w3)}. If all three
choose to continue, we clear all of their apartments. If bidder 1 or bidder 3
rejects, we lower the offers for the remaining bidders to {(yi, 12w2)}. If both
remaining bidders choose to continue, we have a deal. Otherwise, there is no
trade. In this example, the descending clock can be interpreted as a method
of trial and error. We first try to reach a deal with a higher value. If we fail
and some bidder exits, we try to reach less valuable ones with the remaining
bidders. When the clearing target becomes smaller, the willingness to pay of
the developer may decrease. Therefore, the offer to the remaining bidders will
have to adjust.
2. Consider w3 = 0. That is, the developer wants only 2 contiguous buildings.
Now we can see that bidder 1 and 3 are in competing positions. If either one of
them chooses to quit, it is still possible to reach a deal with the remaining two
bidders. But if bidder 2 quits, there is no trade at all. Thus, in this case, we
can first alternatively lower the offers to bidder 1 and bidder 3 starting from
Xit = {(yi, 12w2)}, until one of them exits. We start from
1
2
w2 because that is
the highest possible payment to these bidders. Suppose that bidder 3 exits at t
and X1t = {(y1, p)} and X3t = {(y3, p)}, we offer bidder 2 X2t = {(y2, w2−p)}.
In this case, the descending clock is a device of competition. In the process of
lowering the offer alternatively, bidder 1 and bidder 3 are competing for the
right to be in the transaction. Notice that the offer to bidder 2 also depends
on the competition result. Because the payment to bidder 1 or bidder 3 has
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been lowered in the competition, after one bidder quits, we can offer a higher
payment to bidder 2. Thus, compared to a mechanism with just 2 bidders
and when each of them is necessary, having an additional bidder introduces
competition. With competition among some subset of bidders, we can make
better offers to the essential bidders and increase the probability of trade.
Now we look at an example to see why having more options can increase the
probability of trade.
Example 8 Suppose that there are two buildings and there is one apartment in
each building. Suppose that the developer wants only to redevelop building 1. We
will show that having the owner of building 2 participate can increase the probability
of clearing building 1.
Let Y1 = {y01, y11, y21} = {(1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 1)}. y11 = (0, 0) is the allocation with-
out any non-monetary compensation. y21 = (0, 1) is the allocation where bidder
1 is allocated the apartment of bidder 2. Let Y2 = {y02, y12} = {(0, 1), (0, 0)}. In
this example, if bidder 1 gets the apartment of bidder 2, bidder 2 must clear his
apartment. Thus, the auctioneer should be choosing from the following set of alloca-
tions: {(y01, y02), (y11, y02), (y21, y12)}. Suppose that the value to the developer of clearing
building 1 is v̄ ∈ (0, 1). The following two cases compare the differences between
mechanisms with and without non-monetary compensation.
If the non-monetary compensation outcome cannot be offered as in the previous
example, the best the auctioneer can do is offer the bidder in building 1: Xit =
{(y1i , v̄)}. The probability of transaction is then v̄.
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Now suppose that the non-monetary compensation is offered. Then one way
to run this auction is as follows. Let p1, p2 ≥ 0 such that p1 + p2 = v̄. First,
offer to bidder 2: X2t = {(y12, p2)}. If bidder 2 chooses to continue, offer to bidder 1
X1t = {(y11, v̄), (y21, p1)}. If bidder 1 also chooses to continue, call bidder 1 again with
the closing outcomes X1t. At this point, we are certain that building 1 is cleared.
What is not certain yet is the way it is cleared. If bidder 1 chooses to get the
apartment of bidder 2, (y21, p1), we call bidder 2 and forcing him to choose (y
1
2, p2).
On the other hand, if bidder 1 chooses to clear his apartment, we force bidder 2 to
quit.
However, if bidder 2 exits at the beginning, then offer to bidder 1 X ′1t =
{(y11, v̄)} as before. Therefore, in this scenario, having the option to move to apart-
ment 2 does not harm bidder 1 at all. If bidder 2 does not accept (y12, p2), things
go as usual. But if bidder 2 accepts, bidder 1 is offered a larger set of choices and
the choices are not inferior. Thus, the probability of bidder 1 rejecting both options
decreases. The total payment conditioned on the developer getting building 1 does
not change either. Therefore, the expected welfare increases if we allow this kind of
transaction.
This example shows that having an additional option increases the probability
of having a transaction. There will be a similar effect if we add other options like
getting a new apartment. In the land assembly market, the probability of getting
consent from a fixed group of people can be low when the group is large. Therefore,
any way to increase the probability of people saying yes will help. In the market of
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land assembly, bidders’ preferences and budget constraints are diverse. Monetary
compensation might not be enough for everyone.
3.5 The Limitations of PED-LA
In this section, we discuss some limitations that are relevant to the land as-
sembly use cases.
3.5.1 The Existing Apartment Offers
Example 9 Suppose there is 1 clearable building, which contains two existing apart-
ments B = {1, 2}. There is another apartment 3 in the nearby building which,
however, is not clearable. The owner of apartment is willing to participate in the
mechanism, hoping to get a new apartment in the newly developed building. In this
case, the set of existing apartment is KE = {k1, k2, k3}. We assume that the devel-
oper builds only one type of new apartment, and we assume that the supply of the
apartments will be sufficient once the building is built, KN = {kn}.
Thus, for i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3}, an allocation is a 4-tuple, yi = (yik1 , yik2 , yik3 , yikn).
For kj ∈ KE, yikj ∈ {0, 1}, and yikn ∈ R+.
Take the bidder 1 as an example. The endowment for bidder 1 is y01 =
(1, 0, 0, 0). The allocation for him to get an existing apartment as compensation
is yei = (0, 0, 1, 0). The allocation for him to get a 1,000 ft
2 apartment as compen-
sation is yn1 = (0, 0, 0, 1000). The allocation for him not to get any non-monetary
compensation is ym1 = (0, 0, 0, 0). We assume that similar notations apply to bidder
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2.
For bidder 3, we offer him only the endowment allocation y03, the new apart-
ment offer yn3 and the pure monetary compensation allocation y
m
3 .
Then we can offer the following set for i = 1, 2 in the early periods in the
auction, Xit = {x0it, xeit, xnit, xmit } = {(y0i , 0), (yei , peit), (yni , pnit), (ymit , pnit)}. The prices
have time subscripts to indicate that they can decrease with time. The size of the
new apartment also can decrease with time.
Suppose that in the early stage of this auction, everyone is active. In particular,
the outcome to move to apartment 3 are still offered, which are xeit ∈ Xit. Then we
show that the auctioneer cannot feasibly clear the market. The reason is as follows:
1. Suppose we close for bidder 1. In that case, we cannot prevent him from
choosing to move to the apartment of bidder 3. If that happens, we must clear
the apartment for bidder 3 and we cannot prevent him from choosing a new
apartment.
2. For the developer to supply a new apartment, we must clear both bidder 1 and
bidder 2.
3. Then we also must clear bidder 2. To prevent him from choosing the offer to
move to apartment 3, we need to remove it from the continuation offers. But
by doing so, the offer set becomes inferior and therefore—as required by the
property of persistence of exits—we need to offer the bidder the chance to exit
to his endowment.
4. If bidder 2 chooses to exit to his endowment, the new building cannot be built
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and the promise to bidder 3 cannot be fulfilled.
Readers can verify that a similar argument would apply when we first clear bidder 2
and bidder 3. Therefore, at some state of the auction, we need to remove the offer
of moving to apartment 3 from either bidder 1 or bidder 2.
In a more general setting, an existing apartment can be associated with only
one bidder in a clearable building. It is not a good that can be generally offered to
a large set of bidders.
3.5.2 No Mutual Influence within a Building
We continue with the previous example. We assume that we remove the offer
of moving to apartment 3 from bidder 2’s continuation offers. Let’s suppose that
after some periods of lowering prices, the sum of the compensations are below the
willingness to pay of the developer. Let’s look at how the auctioneer will close the
auction.
We show that because bidder 1 and bidder 2 are in the same building, they
must always be closed together. When we close bidder 1 and force him to choose a
winning outcome in X1t, because all the allocation in Xit requires bidder 1 to clear
his apartment, it is certain that the building must be cleared. Therefore we should
force bidder 2 to clear his as well. To meet the condition that we are clearing a
building, bidder 1’s value and his choice within X1t will not have any effect on the
outcome offered to bidder 2.
In the analytical framework of Chapter 2, this means that on the condition
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that the building is cleared, none of the bidders in the same building will have an
influence on one another. The outcomes offered to each of the bidders in the same
building will share the same constant pricing space.
On the contrary, the choice of bidder 1 can have some effect on bidder 3. If
bidder 1 chooses to move to apartment 3, then of course the auctioneer has to close
bidder 3 immediately and force him to clear his apartment for bidder 1. But If
bidder 1 chooses not to move to apartment 3. Then bidder 3 becomes nonessential
in the mechanism. The auctioneer can further lower the offers to bidder 3, and close
only if he accepts one of them.
3.5.3 No Incompatible Multilateral Choices
Bidders in the same building must be closed together, and no mutual influences
could exist. This implies that it is not possible to implement multi-lateral choices
that are mutually incompatible.
Example 10 Consider Example 9. In this case, the developer can offer two designs
of new apartments. KN = {kH , kL}, where KH represents luxury apartments and
kL represents economic apartments. However, he either supplies an entire building
of luxury apartments or an entire building of economic apartments. Thus, if the
2 bidders are choosing a new apartment, they must agree on the design. It is not
feasible for one to choose luxury and the other to choose economic.
However, the bidders in the same building have no influence on each other.
When one bidder has made a choice, this choice has no effect on the other. There-
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fore, there is no way the auctioneer could prevent the bidders from choosing the
infeasible outcome combinations. Thus, the absence of mutual influence can also be
interpreted as an inability to coordinate the allocations. In general, this situation
of mutually incompatible choices is impossible to implement in a PED mechanism.
At some point in the mechanism, we will have to remove all the choices of a luxury
apartment or all the choices of an economic apartment to guarantee the feasibility
of outcomes.
3.5.4 Degree of Complementarity
This mechanism does not fully escape the impossibility theorem of Mailath
and Postlewaite (1990). The mechanism only mitigate the problem by considering
a larger set of possible transactions. However, for a particular allocation, the prob-
ability of finding an acceptable transaction still decreases sharply as the number of
participants gets large. This limits the mechanism’s performance when the building
to be cleared is large.
3.6 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter shows that the PED mechanism is a good candidate for use in
land assembly problems. It implements combinatorial allocation rules on a multi-
dimensional outcome space. Compared to the unanimity rule, which is common
in the literature, the PED mechanism can consider a larger set of clearing tar-
gets. Also, the multi-dimensional outcome space is flexible enough to offer bidders
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non-monetary compensations like new apartments or existing ones. We also show
the limitation of using the PED mechanism. The complementarity within a build-
ing shuts down the mutual influence of bidders on each other, which reduces the
allocation efficiency and disables the ability to coordinate mutually incompatible
allocations.
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Appendix A: Definition of Dynamic Mechanisms
Definition 22 (Dynamic Mechanism) Given a market Ω = 〈N,XN ,UN ,F , w〉,
a dynamic mechanism D on market Ω is a tuple D = 〈H,≺, A,A, ι, IN , χN〉, where
1. H is the set of histories and ≺ is a partial order on H, such that
(a) The graph of histories is a tree.
(b) h∅ denotes the initial history.
(c) H has finite depth, i.e.:
∃d ∈ N : ∀h ∈ H : |{h′ ∈ H : h′ ≺ h}| ≤ d (A.1)
(d) σ(h) denote the set of immediate successors of h ∈ H.
(e) z ∈ H is said to be a terminal history if σ(z) = ∅. Let Z ⊆ H denote the
set of all terminal histories.
2. A is a set of actions.
3. A : H\h∅ → A maps each non-initial history to the last action taken to reach
it.
(a) For all h ∈ H, A is one-to-one on σ(h).
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4. ι : H\Z → N is the player function. ι(h) denotes the player (seller) who is
called to action at history h.
5. Ii is a partition on Hi ≡ {h ∈ H|ι(h) = i}, such that
(a) For any Ii ∈ Ii and h, h′ ∈ Ii, A(h) = A(h′).
(b) For any Ii ∈ Ii, we denote ι(Ii) ≡ ι(h) for any h ∈ Ii. Similarly,
A(Ii) ≡ A(h) for any h ∈ Ii.
(c) Each action available only at one information set, that is, if a ∈ A(Ii),
a′ ∈ A(I ′i) and Ii 6= I ′i, then a 6= a′.
6. χi : Z → Xi maps each terminal history to an outcome for seller i, where





(b) αGi : Z → Ki is the option assignment function for seller i, and
(c) ρGi : Z → R is the payment assignment function for seller i.
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Appendix B: Proofs of Chapter 1
B.0.1 Fundamental Results for Preference Space
We denote the upper contour set of outcome xi for utility function ui as
U(xi, ui) ≡ {x′i ∈ Xi|ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi)}.
Lemma 11 Let U ⊆ Xi, such that
1. U is closed,
2. U is weakly convex, and
3. for all xi ∈ Xi, if xi ∈ U , then for all x′i ≥ xi, we have x′i ∈ U
4. for all yi ∈ Yi, there exists pi ∈ R such that (yi, pi) ∈ U .
Then there exists exit unique ui ∈ Ui such that if xi ∈ ∂U , then U(xi, ui) = U . In
this case, we say ui represents U .
Proof of Lemma 11. Let vi(yi) ≡ − inf{p ∈ R|∀p′ ≥ p, (yi, p′) ∈ U} and ui(xi) =
ui(yi, pi) ≡ vi(yi)−vi(y0i )+pi. Thus, the utility function ui is constructed to be quasi-
linear in the monetary payment. Because U is closed, we have (yi, vi(yi)) ∈ ∂U ⊆ U .
Let xi = (yi, pi) ∈ ∂U , then vi(yi) = −pi and ui(xi) = vi(yi)− vi(y0i ) + pi = −vi(y0i ).
Also, by construction, ui(x
0
i ) = ui(y
0
i , 0) = 0. Claim the following:
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1. U(xi, ui) = U : Let x
′
i ∈ U(xi, ui), then
ui(x
′
i) ≥ ui(xi) (B.1)
⇒vi(y′i)− vi(y0i ) + p′i ≥ ui(xi) = −vi(y0i ) (B.2)
⇒vi(yi) ≥ −p′i (B.3)
⇒ inf{p ∈ R|∀p′ ≥ p, (yi, p′) ∈ U} ≤ p′i (B.4)
⇒x′i = (y′i, p′i) ∈ U (B.5)
Thus U(xi, ui) ⊆ U . Now let x′i ∈ U , then
p′i ≥ inf{p ∈ R|∀p′ ≥ p, (yi, p′) ∈ U} (B.6)
⇒− p′i ≤ vi(y′i) (B.7)
⇒vi(y′i) + p′i ≥ 0 (B.8)
⇒vi(y′i)− vi(y0i ) + p′i ≥ −vi(y0i ) (B.9)
⇒ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi) (B.10)
Therefore x′i ∈ U(xi, ui) and U ⊆ U(xi, ui). Thus we have U = U(xi, ui).
2. Ui(x̄i, ui) is weakly convex for all x̄i ∈ Xi.
Let x1i , x
2
i ∈ Ui(x̄i, ui) and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let ∆p = −vi(ȳ) − p̄i. Then vi(v̄i) =
−(p̄i + ∆p). Thus x̂i ≡ (ȳi, pi + ∆p) ∈ ∂U . By the previous claim, U(x̂i, ui) =
U .




i + ∆p) for k = 1, 2. Then we have ui(x̂
k
i ) ≥ ui(x̂i) and
102
x̂i ∈ U(x̂, ui) = U for both k = 1, 2. Since U is convex, we have x̂3i ≡
λx̂1i + (1− λ)x̂2i ∈ U = U(x̂i, ui). Then ui(λx̂1i + (1− λ)x̂2i ) ≥ ui(x̂i). Because
ui is quasi-linear in the payment, we have
ui(λx̂
1
i + (1− λ)x̂2i −∆p) ≥ ui(x̂i −∆p) (B.11)
ui(λx
1
i + (1− λ)x2i ) ≥ ui(x̄i) (B.12)
Thus, U(x̄i, ui) is weakly convex.
3. ui is weakly increasing.
Let x1i >> x
2
i . Let ∆p = −vi(y2i )−p2i . Then as shown in the previous claim, we
have (y2i , p
2
i + ∆p) ∈ ∂U ⊆ U . Then we also have (y1i , p2i + ∆p) ≥ (y2i , p2i + ∆p)
and therefore (y1i , p
2


















Then by quasi-linearity, we arrive ui(xi) > ui(x
2
i ). Therefore, ui is weakly
increasing.
4. ui is continuous.
We show that for all x′i ∈ Xi, U(x′i, ui) is closed. Again, let ∆p = −vi(y′i)− p′i.
Then as shown in the previous claim, we have x̂i ≡ (y′i, p′i + ∆p) ∈ ∂U ⊆ U .
Consider a converging series xni → x′′i such that xni ∈ U(x′i, ui). Construct




i + ∆p). Then we have x̂
n
i → (y′′i , p′′i + δp). By
quasi-linearity, x̂ni ∈ U(x̂i, ui) = U . Because U is closed, we have (y′′i , p′′i +






i, ui) is closed.
Thus, ui represents a quasi-linear, weakly convex, weakly increasing and continuous
preference. Therefore, ui ∈ Ui. The uniqueness comes from the fact that we require
for all ui ∈ Ui, ui(x0i ) = 0.
Lemma 12 Let D be a dynamic mechanism with perfect recall, if I ′i ≺ Ii and Ii is
on the path of Si, then I
′
i is on the path of Si and Xi(Si, Ii) ⊆ Xi(Si, I ′i).
Proof of Lemma 12. Let xi ∈ Xi(Si, Ii), then there exists h ∈ Ii, S−i such that
h ≺ z(h∅, Si, S−i) and χi(z(h∅, Si, S−i)) = xi. Because I ′i ≺ Ii, there exists h1 ∈ I ′i,
h2 ∈ Ii such that h1 ≺ h2 and thus I ′i ∈ ψi(h2). Also, because i has perfect recall,
we have ψi(h) = ψi(h
2), and therefore I ′i ∈ ψi(h). That is, there exists h′′ ∈ I ′i such
that h′′ ≺ h ≺ z(h∅, Si, S−i). Therefore, xi ∈ Xi(Si, I ′i) and Xi(Si, Ii) ⊆ Xi(Si, I ′i).




i ∈ Xi. If (x1i , x2i ) is not convex-
dominated in X ′i, then there exits ui ∈ Ui such that ui(x1i ) > ui(x2i ) > ui(x′i) for all
x′i ∈ X ′i\{x1i , x2i }.
Proof of Lemma 13. Define
U(x1i , x
2
i , δ) ≡
⋃
λ∈[0,1]
U(λx1i + (1− λ)x2i , δ) (B.13)
Claim: There exits δ > 0 such that for all δ′ < δ, xi /∈ U(x1i , x2i , δ′).
Let λ ∈ [0, 1], because xi does not convex-dominate (x1i , x2i ), we have xi 
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λx1i + (1 − λ)x2i . Thus, there exits δ(λ) such that for all δ′ ≤ δ(λ), xi /∈ U(λx1i +





Because U(x1i , x
2
i , δ) is a union of closed and convex sets, it is also closed and
convex. The remaining conditions in Lemma 11 are again straightforward to verify.
Thus, there exits a unique ui ∈ Ui such that U(x1i , ui) = U(x1i , x2i , δ).
For each x′i ∈ Xi, let ∆p(x′i) ∈ R such that (y′i, p′i+∆p(x′i)) ∈ ∂U(x1i , x2i , δ). Let
ε = 1
2
min{∆p(x′i)|x′i ∈ X ′i}. Let x̂2i = (y2i , p2i + ε) and Û = U(x1i , x̂2i , δ). Then there
exits ûi ∈ Ui such that U(x1i , ûi) = Û . Then for this ûi, ûi(x1i ) > ûi(x2i ) > ûi(x′i) for
all other x′i ∈ X ′i.
Proof of Lemma 1.
First, for the undominated part:
(⇐): Suppose that xi is undominated in X ′i, for δ > 0, construct
U(xi, δ) ≡
{
x̄i ∈ Xi|p̄i ≥ pi +
1
δ
min{0,min{ȳik − yik|k ∈ Ki}}
}
(B.14)
For all x′i ∈ Xi, if not x′i ≥ xi, then there exits δ such that for all δ′ ≤ δ,
x′i /∈ U(xi, δ′). Because X ′i is finite, and xi is not dominated in X ′i, then there exits
δ small enough such that U(xi, δ) ∩X ′i = ∅.
It is straightforward to verify that U(xi, δ) satisfy all conditions specified in
Lemma 11. Therefore, there exits unique ui ∈ Ui such that U(xi, ui) = U(xi, δ).
Because the preference is strictly increasing in payment and U(xi, ui)∩ (X ′i\{xi}) =
∅. We have ui(xi) > ui(x′i) for all x′i ∈ X ′i\{xi}.
(⇒): Suppose that there exists ui ∈ Ui such that ui(xi) > ui(x′i) for all
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x′i ∈ X ′i\{xi}. If there exists x′′i ∈ X ′i such that x′′i 6= xi and x′i dominates xi, then
since ui is weakly increasing, we have ui(x
′′
i ) ≥ ui(xi), which is a contradiction.
(⇒): Suppose that xi is not weakly undominated in Xi(Ii). Then xi is strictly
dominated by some x′i ∈ Xi(Ii). Because ui is strictly increasing in payment and
weakly increasing in all other dimensions, we have ui(x
′
i) > ui(xi). Therefore,
xi /∈ Xi(Ii, ui). Therefore, if xi ∈ X∗i (Ii, ui), then xi is weakly undominated in
Xi(Ii).
Second, for the weakly undominated part:
(⇐): Suppose that xi is weakly undominated in Xi(Ii). For δ > 0, construct
U(xi, δ) ≡
{
x̄i ∈ Xi|p̄i ≥ pi +
1
δ
min{0,min{ȳik − yik|k ∈ Ki}}
}
(B.15)
If x′i ≥ xi, since xi is not strictly dominated, we must have p′i = pi. Then
x′i ∈ ∂U(xi, δ).
For all x′i ∈ Xi, if not x′i ≥ xi, then there exits δ such that for all δ′ ≤ δ,
x′i /∈ U(xi, δ′). Because X ′i is finite, there exits δ small enough such that Ů(xi, δ)∩X ′i
is empty.
It is straightforward to verify that U(xi, δ) satisfy all conditions specified in
Lemma 11. Therefore, there exits unique ui ∈ Ui such that U(xi, ui) = U(xi, δ).
Because Ů(xi, δ) ∩X ′i is empty, xi ∈ X∗i (Ii, ui).
B.0.2 Elements of Strategic Simplicity
Proof of Theorem 1. If not, then there exists Ii ∈ Ii, an alternative action
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a′ ∈ A(Ii)\{Si(Ii)} and x′i ∈ Xi(a′) such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi) for all xi ∈ Xi(a) where
a = Si(Ii). Because x
′
i ∈ Xi(a′), there exist S ′i such that xi ∈ Xi(Ii, S ′i). That implies
there are S−i, such that x
′
i = χi(z(h0, S
′
i, S−i)). Also, because all the achievable
outcomes by a are less desirable then x′i, we have ui(h∅, Si, S−i) < ui(h∅, S
′
i, S−i).
This equation contradicts with Equation (1.1). Thus the strategy is not weakly
dominant. Hence, if a strategy is weakly dominant, it has to be optimistic.
Proof of Theorem ??. Let a ∈ A(Ii), and let Si(a) be the set of strategies Si such
that Si(Ii) = a and that Ii is on the path of Si. It should be clear that xi ∈ Xi(a)
if and only if it is achievable by some Si ∈ Si(a). That is, xi ∈ Xi(Ii, Si). Thus,
it follows that Xi(a
′) = ∪{Xi(Ii, S ′i)|Si ∈ Si(a′)} for all a′ ∈ A(Ii). Therefore, the
RHS of Equation (1.2) and Equation (1.4) are equivalent.
Proof of Theorem 3. The sufficient part is trivial. Because the cautiously
optimistic strategy Si always exists. Then by Theorem ??, Si is obviously dominant
for ui. Thus, D is OSP.
We now show the necessary part. Suppose D is OSP. Let i ∈ N , ui ∈ Ui, Si
be cautiously optimistic for ui. By Theorem 9, D satisfies the Single Continuation
Property and the Persistence of Exit Property. By Lemma 24, Si is regret-free.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let ψi(Ii) = {I0i , a0, I1i , a1, . . . , In−1i , an−1}, and let Ii be
denoted as Ini and Si(Ii) = a
n. Because Ii is on the path of Si, we have Si(I
m
i ) = a
m
for all m = 0, . . . , n. We prove by induction that for all m = 0, . . . , n, we have
1. if Si secures a fantasy outcome xi ∈ X∗i (Imi , ui) at Imi , then xi is an exit
outcome at Imi .
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2. if Si does not secure any outcome, there exists a continuation outcome in
Xi(Si(I
m
i )) ∩X∗i (Imi , ui).
First, let m = 0, then XGi (I
0
i ) = ∅. First, we consider that Si secures some fantasy
outcome xi ∈ X∗i (I0i , ui). Thus, xi is assurable at I0i . By Lemma 1, xei is weakly
undominated in Xi(I
0




i ) is empty, xi is also weakly undominated in
Xi(I
0
i ) ∪XGi (I0i ). Therefore, xi is an exit outcome. Next, we consider the case that
if Si does not secure any outcome. Because D is regret-free, by Theorem 5, there
exists an action a ∈ A(I0i ) such that X∗i (I0i , ui) ⊆ Xi(a) and X∗i (I0i , ui)∩Xi(a′) = ∅.




i , ui) are
nonassurable. Therefore there exists an undominated outcome x∗i ∈ X∗i (I0i , ui).
Then xi is also undominated in Xi(I
0
i ), because if not, then x
∗
i is dominated by some
x′i. Because ui is weakly increasing, ui(x
′
i) ≥ ui(x∗i ), then x′i ∈ X∗i (I0i , ui). We then




i , ui). Then
we also have that x∗i is undominated in Xi(I
0
i ) ∪ XGi (I0i ) since XGi (I0i ) is empty.
Therefore, x∗i is a continuation outcome at I
0




i , ui) ⊆ Xi(a) =
Xi(Si(Ii)), xi ∈ Xi(Si(Imi )) ∩ X∗i (Imi , ui). Therefore, the statements are true for
m = 0.
Next, suppose that the statements are true for all m ≤ n−1, we now show that
they are also true form = n. Suppose thatX∗i (I
n
i , ui) contains no assurable outcome:
just as we argued in the previous bullet, there exists an outcome x∗i ∈ X∗i (Ini , ui)
which is undominated in Xi(I
n
i ). Now we argue that it is also not dominated in
XGi (I
n
i ). Suppose the opposite. Then there exists x
g




inates x∗i . That is, ui(x
g
i ) ≥ ui(x∗i ). Because x
g
i ∈ XGi (Ini ), we have x
g
i ∈ Xi(a′) for
some a ∈ A(I ′i) and I ′i ∈ ψi(Ii). Because D is regret-proof, by the Persistence of
Exists Property, xgi should be assurable at the earliest I
′′
i such that Ii ≺ I ′′i and that
ui(x
g
i ) ≥ max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(I ′′i )}. Then, a cautiously optimistic strategy will secure
some of the assurable outcome at I ′′i . Because Xi(Si, I
m
i ) ⊆ Xi(Si, I ′′i ), therefore,
Si must secure that outcome at I
n
i , contradicting our assumption in the beginning.
This argument also applies for xgi = xi, therefore, not only is xi undominated in
XGi (I
n
i ), but also xi /∈ XGi (Ini ). Therefore, xi is a continuation outcome. Again, by
the single continuation property, xi ∈ X∗i (Ini , ui) ∩Xi(Si(Ini )).
Now suppose X∗i (I
n
i , ui) contains some assurable outcome x
e
i . As previously
argued, xei is weakly undominated in Xi(I
n
i ). Now we argue that it is also weakly
undominated in XGi (I
n
i ). Suppose the opposite, which implies that there exists
xgi ∈ XGi (Ini ) such that x
g
i strictly dominates x
e
i . Then we have ui(x
g
i ) > ui(x
e
i ).
Since xei ∈ X∗i (Ini , ui), we have x
g
i /∈ Xi(Ini ). This is a condition where bidder
i regrets that he didn’t choose xgi , which contradicts with that the mechanism is
regret-free and that Si is cautiously optimistic before I
n





i )∪XGi (Ini ) and is an exit outcome. Therefore, both statemenst
are true for m = n.
Finally, we show the coverse part. Suppose that xi is a continuation outcome
at Ii. Then xi is undominated in Xi(Ii) ∪XGi (Ii). Then by Lemma 1, there exists
ui ∈ Ui, such that ui(xi) > ui(x′i) for all xi ∈ Xi(Ii) ∪XGi (Ii). Because xi ∈ Xi(am)
for all m < n, then the best-case outcome achievable by am must be no worse than
xi, and therefore is strictly better than all the outcomes achievable by other actions.
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Thus, for a cautiously optimistic strategy, Si(I
m
i ) = a
m, which implies that Ii is on
the path of Si and X
∗
i (Ii, ui) = {xi}.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let x′i ∈ XCi (I ′i). Because Ii ≺ I ′i, we have Xi(I ′i) ⊆ Xi(Ii)
and hence x′i ∈ Xi(Ii). If x′i ∈ XCi (Ii), then it is trivial that x′i ≥ x′i. If x′i /∈ XCi (Ii),
then it implies that it is dominated in Xi(Ii)∪XGi (Ii). But because XGi (I ′i) ⊇ XGi (Ii)




i), it is not dominated in X
G
i (Ii). Thus, it is
dominated in Xi(Ii). Then there must exists
if xi is a continuation outcome at Ii, then either xi is also a continuation
outcome at I ′i or there exists some continuation outcome x
′
i that dominates xi.
Therefore, in a bidder’s perspective, the announced outcomes are becoming inferior
overtime.
Proof of Theorem 5. Because D is OSP, then D satisfies the Persistence of Exit
Property and the Single Continuation Property. Then the first and second bullet
are the special case of Lemma 22 with k = n + 1. The third bullet is the direct
implication of the Single Continuation Property.
B.0.3 Necessary Conditions for OSP
Lemma 14 Let D be an OSP mechanism, ui ∈ Ui, Si obviously dominant for ui, if
xi ∈ Xi(Ii) and that ui(xi) > ui(x′i) for all x′i ∈ Xi(Ii) ∪XGi (Ii)\{xi}, then Ii is on
the path of Si.
Proof of Lemma 14. It suffice to show that for all I ′i ∈ ψi(Ii), Si(I ′i) ∈ ψi(Ii).
Suppose there exists I ′i ∈ ψi(Ii) such that Si(I ′i) = a′ /∈ ψi(Ii). Because Si is
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optimistic, there exists x∗i ∈ X∗i (I ′i, ui) such that x∗i ∈ Xi(a′). Then x∗i ∈ XGi (Ii).
Because xi is a continuation outcome, therefore xi /∈ XGi (Ii) and x∗i 6= xi. Then
ui(xi) > ui(x
∗
i ). However, since I
′
i ≺ Ii, we must have Xi(Ii) ⊆ Xi(I ′i), which
implies xi ∈ Xi(I ′i) and contradicts that x∗i ∈ X∗i (I ′i, ui). Therefore, Si(I ′i) ∈ ψi(Ii)
for all I ′i ∈ ψi(Ii) and Ii is on the path of Si.
Lemma 15 Let D be an OSP dynamic mechanism, if xi is a continuation outcome
at Ii, then xi is achievable by only one action in A(Ii).
Proof of Lemma 15. Suppose the claim is not true, that is, there exists A′ ⊆ A(Ii)
such that |A′| ≥ 2 and xi ∈ Xi(a′) for all a′ ∈ A. Because xi is a continuation
outcome, xi is nonassurable and undominated in Ii. There exists ui ∈ Ui such that
ui(xi) ≥ ui(x′i) for all x′i ∈ Xi(Ii)∪XGi (Ii). Let Si be an obviously dominant strategy
for ui. By Lemma 14, Ii is on the path of Si. Also, because Si is optimistic for ui,
Si(Ii) = a for some a ∈ A′. Because xi is also achievable by other actions in A′,
obvious dominance requires that
min{ui(x′i)|x′i ∈ Xi(Si, Ii)} ≥ ui(xi) (B.16)
However, since xi is nonassurable at Ii, Xi(Si, Ii) 6= {xi}. That implies
there exists x′′i 6= xi such that x′′i ∈ Xi(Si, Ii). Since ui(x′′i ) < ui(xi), we have
min{ui(x′i)|x′i ∈ Xi(Si, Ii)} < ui(xi), which contradicts with equation (B.16) and
completes the proof.
Lemma 16 Let D be an OSP dynamic mechanism, if xi, x
′
i are distinct continuation
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outcomes at Ii, and xi ∈ Xi(a), x′i ∈ Xi(a′) for some distinct actions a, a′ ∈ A(Ii),
then (xi, x
′
i) is convex-dominated in Xi(Ii) ∪XGi (Ii).
Proof of Lemma 16. Suppose not, that is, (xi, x
′
i) is not convex-dominated in
Xi(Ii)∪XGi (Ii), then by Lemma 13, there exists ui ∈ Ui such that ui(xi) > ui(x′i) ≥
ui(x
′′
i ) for all x
′′
i ∈ Xi(Ii) ∪ XGi (Ii) and x′′i 6= xi, x′i. Because D is OSP, then there
exists an obviously dominant strategy Si for ui. By Theorem 1, Si is optimistic.
Therefore Si(Ii) = a.
By Lemma 14, we have Ii is on the path of Si. Also, because Si is obviously
dominant, we have
min{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Ii, Si)} ≥ ui(x′i) (B.17)
By Lemma 15, x′i is not achievable by a, therefore x
′
i /∈ Xi(Ii, Si). Also, because
xi is nonassurable, Xi(Ii, Si) 6= {xi}, and that implies Xi(Ii, Si) contains some
x′′i 6= xi, x′i. However, the fact that ui(x′′i ) < ui(x′i) contradicts with Equation (B.17)
and completes the proof.
Lemma 17 Let D be an OSP dynamic mechanism, then for all Ii ∈ Ii, xgi ∈ XGi (Ii)
and xdi ∈ XDi (Ii), if (xdi , x
g




Proof of Lemma 17. Suppose xgi is nonassurable at Ii. By Lemma 13, there
exists ui ∈ Ui such that
ui(x
d
i ) > ui(x
g
i ) > ui(xi) (B.18)
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for all xi ∈ Xi(Ii) ∪XGi (Ii)\{xdi , x
g
i }. Because D is OSP, there exists an obviously
dominant strategy Si for ui.
Claim that Ii is on the path of Si. Let ψi(Ii) = {I1i , a1, . . . , Ini , an}. It suffice to
show that for all Iki ∈ ψi(Ii), Si(Iki ) ∈ ψi(Ii). First, we consider the case for k = n.
Because xdi is a disappearing outcome at Ii, therefore x
d
i is a continuation outcome
at Ini and x
d
i ∈ Xi(an). By Equation (B.18), ui(xdi ) > ui(x′i) for all x′i ∈ Xi(a′),
a′ ∈ A(Ini )\{an}. Therefore, the optimistic strategy Si should choose an. Also,
because xdi ∈ Xi(Ini ), we must have xdi ∈ Xi(Iki ) for all k ≤ n. Next, consider
the case for k < n. Suppose there exists k < n such that Si(I
k
i ) = a
′ /∈ ψi(Ii).
Because Si is optimistic, there exists x
∗
i ∈ X∗i (Iki , ui) such that x∗i ∈ Xi(a′). Then
x∗i ∈ XGi (Ii). Because xdi is a continuation outcome at Ini , therefore xdi /∈ XGi (Ii)
and x∗i 6= xdi . Then, by Equation (B.18), we have ui(xdi ) > ui(x∗i ). However, since
xdi ∈ Xi(Iki ), x∗i /∈ X∗i (Iki , ui), reaching a contradiction. Therefore, Si(Iki ) ∈ ψi(Ii)
for all Iki ∈ ψi(Ii) and Ii is on the path of Si.
Because xgi ∈ XGi (Ii), there exists Iki ∈ ψi(Ii) such that x
g
i ∈ Xi(a′) for some
a′ ∈ A(Ii)\{ak}. Since Si is obviously dominant, we must have
min{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Iki , Si)} ≥ ui(x
g
i ) (B.19)
By Lemma 12, Xi(Ii, Si) ⊆ Xi(Iki , Si). Because x
g
i is nonassurable at Ii, there exists
x′i 6= x
g
i such that x
′





i ) and x
′
i ∈ Xi(Iki , Si), contradicting Equation B.19. Thus,
xgi must be assurable at Ii.
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Lemma 18 Let D be an OSP dynamic mechanism and let z ∈ Z. If XDi (z) 6= ∅,
then for all xdi ∈ XDi (z) and x
g
i ∈ XGi (z), (xdi , x
g
i ) is convex-dominated by χi(z).
Proof of Lemma 18. This Lemma is a special case for Lemma 17. In a normal




i ) is not convex-dominated in Xi
B.0.4 Sufficient Condition for OSP
Lemma 19 Let X ′i be a finite subset of Xi, let xi, x
′
i ∈ Xi and xi 6= x′i. Let
V (xi, x
′
i) ≡ {x̄i ∈ X ′i\{xi, x′i}|(xi, x′i) is convex-dominated by x̄i}. Then if x′′i ∈
V (xi, x
′
i), then V (xi, x
′′
i ) ⊂ V (xi, x′i).
Lemma 20 Suppose D satisfies the Persistent Exit Property, let (xdi , x
g
i ) ∈ XDi (Ii)×




i ) is convex-undominated in Xi(Ii), then x
g
i is assurable at Ii.
Proof of Lemma 20. Suppose xgi is not assurable at Ii. Because D satisfies the
persistent exit property, we have (xdi , x
g
i ) is convex-dominated in Xi(Ii)∪XGi (Ii). For
(xi, x
′
i) ∈ X2i , xi 6= x′i, we define V (xi, x′i) ≡ {x̄i ∈ Xi(Ii)∪XGi (Ii)|x̄i convex-dominates (xi, x′i)}.
Then we have V (xdi , x
g
i ) ∩ Xi(Ii) = ∅ and V (xdi , x
g
i ) ⊆ XGi (Ii). Because the game




i ). By Lemma 19, if
we choose any x1i ∈ V (xdi , x
g




i ) ⊂ V (xdi , x
g
i ) ⊆ XGi (Ii). Then for
k ≥ 2, if V (xdi , xk−1i ) 6= ∅, we choose xki ∈ V (xdi , xk−1i ). The process should stop
within finite steps as V (xdi , x
g




i ) strictly shrinks.
Let x̂gi = x
K




i ) is not convex-dominated




at Ii. Then x̂
g
i ∈ Xi(Ii) which contradicts with the assumption that (xdi , x
g
i ) is not
convex-dominated in Xi(Ii).
Lemma 21 Let D be a dynamic mechanism that satisfies the Persistent Exit Prop-
erty and the Single Continuation Property. Let ui ∈ Ui, Si be cautiously optimistic
for ui, Ii ∈ Ii on the path of Si, if there exists xdi ∈ XDi (Ii), x
g
i ∈ XGi (Ii) such that
ui(x
d
i ) > max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Ii)} and ui(x
g




Proof. Suppose xgi is nonassurable at Ii. Let v = max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Ii)}. Ac-
cording to the Persistent Exit Property and Lemma 20, there exists x̄i ∈ Xi(Ii)




i ). Thus, there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
x̄i ≥ λxdi + (1 − λ)x
g
i . Because ui represents an increasing and convex preference,
we have:
ui(x̄i) ≥ui(λxdi + (1− λ)x
g
i ) (B.20)
≥λui(xdi ) + (1− λ)ui(x
g
i ) (B.21)
>λv + (1− λ)v (B.22)
=v = max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Ii)} (B.23)
Because x̄i ∈ Xi(Ii), Equation B.23 is a contradiction. Thus, xgi is assurable at Ii.
Let XCi (I
k
i ) denote the set of continuation outcomes at I
k
i .
Lemma 22 If D satisfies the Persistent Exit Property and the Single Continuation
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Property, then for all ui ∈ Ui, Si cautiously optimistic for ui, and Ii on the path of
Si. Let ψi(Ii) = {I1i , a1, . . . , Ini , an}, and denote Ii = In+1i . If X∗i (Ii, ui) contains no
assurable outcomes, then for all k = 1, . . . n+ 1, we have
1. X∗i (I
k
i , ui) ⊆ Xi(ak) ∩XCi (Iki )
2. X∗i (I
k
i , ui) ∩Xi(a′) = ∅ for all a′ 6= ak, a′ ∈ A(Iki ).
Proof of Lemma 22. The proof proceeds with a series of labeled claims.
C1 for all k = 1, . . . , n, Xi(I
k
i , Si) is not a singleton. That is, Si does not assure
any outcomes at Iki .
Because Si is cautiously optimistic, if Si assures xi at I
n+1
i for some xi ∈
Xi(I
n=1
i ), then that implies xi is assurable at I
n+1
i and xi ∈ X∗i (In+1i , ui),
contradicting the assumption that Xi(I
n+1
i ) contains no assurable outcomes.
Thus, Xi(I
n+1
i ) is not a singleton. By Lemma 12, for all I
k
i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
we have Xi(Ii, Si) ⊆ Xi(Iki , Si), therefore Xi(Iki , Si) is not a singleton, either.
Hence Si does not assure any outcome at I
k
i .
The rest of the proof proceeds with mathematical induction. Suppose k = 1,
we first show that X∗i (I
1
i , ui) ⊆ XCi (I1i ). Let x∗i ∈ X∗i (I1i , ui). Because I1i is the first
time that i is called to play, XGi (Ii) = ∅. Therefore, x∗i /∈ XGi (I1i ). Furthermore, x∗i ∈
X∗i (I
1
i , ui) implies that x
∗
i is undominated in Xi(I
1
i ), and hence also undominated in
X∗i (Ii)∪XGi (Ii). Finally, by Claim C1, Si does not assure any outcomes at I1i . Thus,
X∗i (I
1
i , ui) contains no assurable outcomes and x
∗
i is nonassurable at I
1
i . Therefore




Next, we show that for all a′ ∈ A(I1i )\{a1}, X∗i (I1i , ui) ∩Xi(a′) = ∅. Suppose
the opposite, that is, there exists a′ ∈ A(I1i ), x′i ∈ X∗i (I1i , ui) such that a′ 6= a1 and
x′i ∈ Xi(a′). By the definition of the Single Continuation Property, we must have





i is not a continuation outcome. That is, there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such
that x̄i ≥ λx∗i + (1− λ)x′i. Because ui is convex and nondecreasing, we have
ui(x̄i) ≥ ui(λx∗i + (1− λ)x′i) (B.24)






i ) = ∅, x̄i ∈ Xi(I1i ). That implies x̄i ∈ X∗i (I1i , ui) and that x̄i is a
continuation outcome at I1i , which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, we cannot
have a′ ∈ Xi(I1i ) such that a′ 6= a1 and Xi(a′) ∩ X∗i (I1i , ui) 6= ∅. Therefore all
outcomes in X∗i (I
1
i , ui) are achievable only by a
1. Thus, we proved both claims for
k = 1.
Suppose the statement is true for all k ≤ m, and consider the case for k =
m+ 1.
We first prove that X∗i (I
m+1
i , ui) ⊆ XCi (Im+1i ). Suppose it is not true, that is,
there exists x∗i ∈ Xi(Im+1i , ui) such that x∗i is not a continuation outcome at Im+1i .
C2 x∗i ∈ XGi (Im+1i ) or x∗i is dominated in XGi (Im+1i ).
Because x∗i is achievable but nonassurable at Ii, to make it not a continuation




i ). Then the claim follows from the fact that x
∗




C3 x∗i /∈ X∗i (Imi , ui).
If so, our assumption for k = m requires that x∗i is a continuation outcome at
Imi . Then by the definition of continuation outcome, we have x
∗
i /∈ XGi (Imi )




i ). Also, by the Single Continuation
Lemma, x∗i is not achievable by any actions other than Si(I
m
i ). Hence we have
x∗i /∈ XGi (Im+1i ). Next, because Xi(Im+1i )∪XGi (Im+1i ) ⊆ Xi(Imi )∪XGi (Imi ), we
also have x∗i is undominated in Xi(I
m+1




x∗i , if x
∗
i ∈ XGi (Im+1i )
x′i ∈ XGi (Im+1i ) : x′i ≥ x∗i if x∗i is dominated in XGi (Im+1i )
(B.27)
and,
xdi ∈ X∗i (Imi , ui) (B.28)
In either case, we have ui(x
g






C4 xdi ∈ XDi (Im+1i ) and ui(xdi ) > ui(x∗i ).
By the induction assumption for k = m, we have that xdi is a continuation
outcome at Imi . By the Single Continuity Property, x
d
i ∈ Xi(am). Because
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x∗i /∈ X∗i (Imi , ui) but x∗i ∈ Xi(Imi ), we must have ui(xdi ) > ui(x∗i ). That also
implies that xdi /∈ Xi(Imi ). Thus, xdi ∈ XDi (Im+1i ) and ui(xdi ) > ui(x∗i ).
By Lemma 21, xgi should be assurable at Ii. That also implies that x
g
i ∈ X∗i (Im+1i ).





which contradicts Claim C1 and therefore x∗i should be a continuation outcome and
X∗i (I
m+1
i ) ⊆ XCi (Im+1i ).
Next, we prove that for all a′ ∈ A(Ii)\{a}, X∗i (Im+1i , ui)∩Xi(a′) = ∅. Suppose
that there exists a′ ∈ A(Im+1i ), a′ 6= ak+1 and x′i ∈ X∗i (Im+1i ) ∩ Xi(a′). Then by
the definition of the Single Continuation Property, there exists xgi ∈ Xi(Im+1i ) ∪
XGi (I
m+1






i) and that x
g
i is not a continuation
outcome at Im+1i . Because ui is convex, we have ui(x
g
i ) ≥ ui(x∗i ). If x
g
i ∈ Xi(Im+1i ),
then xgi ∈ X∗i (Im+1i , ui) and therefore x
g
i ∈ XGi (Im+1i ).
Because xgi ∈ XGi (Im+1i ), there exists 1 ≤ k̄ ≤ m such that x
g
i ∈ Xi(a′) for
some a′ ∈ A(I k̄i ) and a′ 6= ak̄. Also, x
g
i < max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(I k̄i )}. Because if not,
xgi ∈ X∗i (I k̄i , ui) and x
g
i can only be achievable by a
k̄.
Let vk = max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Iki )} for k = 1, . . . ,m+1. Because the set Xi(Iki )
is shrinking in k, we have vk is nonincreasing in k. Thus, if ui(x
g
i ) ≥ vk, then for all
k′ ≥ k, we also have ui(xgi ) ≥ vk. Thus, there exists k̄ < k̂ ≤ m + 1 such that k̂ is
the least k to satisfy ui(x
g
i ) ≥ vk.
Then by Lemma 23, xgi is assurable at I
k̂
i , which implies x
g
i ∈ X∗i (I k̂i , ui). Then
because Si is cautiously optimistic, Xi(I
k̂
i , Si) is a singleton, contradicting Claim C1.
Therefore, we have X∗i (I
m+1
i )∩Xi(a′) = ∅ for all a′ ∈ A(Im+1i ) such that a′ 6= am+1.
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Lemma 23 Suppose that D satisfies the Persistent Exit Property and the Single
Continuation Property. Let ui ∈ Ui, Si cautiously optimistic for ui and Ii on the
path of Si. Let ψi(Ii) = {I1i , a1, . . . , Ini , an} and let x
g
i ∈ XGi (Ii). Suppose that for
all Iki ∈ ψi(Ii), we have
1. X∗i (I
k
i , ui) ⊆ Xi(ak) ∩XCi (Iki )
2. X∗i (I
k
i , ui) ∩Xi(a′) = ∅ for all a′ 6= ak, a′ ∈ A(Iki ).
3. ui(x
g





i ) ≥ Vi(Ii, ui), then x
g
i is assurable at Ii.
Proof. Let xdi ∈ X∗i (Ini , ui), then xdi is a continuation outcome, xdi ∈ Xi(an) and
ui(x
d
i ) > ui(x
g
i ). Because ui(x
g
i ) ≥ Vi(Ii, ui), therefore xdi /∈ Xi(Ii). Then xdi ∈
XDi (I
k̄
i ) and ui(x
d
i ) > Vi(Ii, ui). By Lemma 21, we have x
g
i is assurable at Ii.
Lemma 24 Suppose D satisfies the Persistent Exit Property and the Single Con-
tinuation Property. Let ui ∈ Ui. If a strategy Si is cautiously optimistic for ui, then
Si is obviously dominant for ui.
Proof of Lemma 24. Let ui ∈ Ui, Si cautiously optimistic for ui. Suppose
Si is not obviously dominant, then there exists Ii on the path of Si, a
′ ∈ A(Ii),
xgi ∈ Xi(a′) such that a′ 6= S(Ii) and
min{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Ii, Si)} < ui(xgi ) (B.29)
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That implies there exists h ∈ Ii, S−i, z′ = z(h∅, Si, S−i) and x′i = χi(z′), such
that h ≺ z′, and ui(x′i) < ui(x
g
i ). Let ψi(z
′) = {I0i , a0, . . . , Ini , an}.
We first show that ui(x
g
i ) ≥ max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Ini )}. Suppose the opposite
and let xdi ∈ X∗i (Imi , ui). Then we must have ui(xdi ) > ui(x
g





i , ui) contains no assurable outcomes. If there is an assurable outcome
in X∗i (I
n
i , ui), then the cautiously optimistic Si should assure some x
∗
i ∈ X∗i (Ini , ui).
That is, Xi(I
n
i , Si) = {x∗i }. However, we have x′i ∈ Xi(Imi , Si) and ui(x∗i ) > ui(x′i),
which is a contradiction. Therefore, X∗i (I
n
i , ui) contains no assurable outcomes. By
Lemma 22, xdi is a continuation outcome at I
n
i , and x
d
i ∈ Xi(an). Therefore, xdi ∈
XDi (z
′). Then by the definition of Persistent Exit property, x′i convex-dominates
(xdi , x
g





i) ≥ ui(λxdi + (1− λ)x
g
i ) (B.30)









Therefore, we arrive a contradiction and we must have ui(x
g




Because xgi ∈ XGi (Ini ), there exists 1 ≤ k̄ ≤ n − 1 such that x
g
i ∈ Xi(a′) for
some a′ ∈ A(I k̄i ) and a′ 6= ak̄. Also, x
g
i < max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(I k̄i )}. Because if not,
xgi ∈ X∗i (I k̄i , ui) and by Lemma 22, x
g
i can only be achievable by a
k̄.
Let vk = max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi(Iki )} for k = 1, . . . , n. Because the set Xi(Iki ) is
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shrinking in k, we have vk is nonincreasing in k. Thus, if ui(x
g
i ) ≥ vk, then for all
k′ ≥ k, we also have ui(xgi ) ≥ vk. Thus, there exists k̄ < k̂ ≤ n such that k̂ is the
least k to satisfy ui(x
g
i ) ≥ vk.
Then by Lemma 23, xgi is assurable at I
k̂
i , which implies x
g
i ∈ X∗i (I k̂i , ui).
Then because Si is cautiously optimistic, Si assures some x
∗
i ∈ X∗i (I k̄i , ui). That is,
Xi(I
k̄
i , Si) = {x∗i }. Thus, we have ui(x∗i ) = ui(x
g




i 6= x′i. Therefore,
x′i /∈ Xi(I k̄i , Si). However, by Lemma 12, we must have Xi(Ii, Si) ⊆ Xi(I x̄i , Si),
which implies x′i ∈ Xi(I x̄i , Si) and reaches a contradiction. Therefore, Si should be
obviously dominant.
B.0.5 The PED Mechanism
Proof of Theorem 6. Let D be an ORP dynamic mechanism. For any z ∈ Z,
i ∈ N , consider the experience ψi(z). For all Ii ∈ ψi, since D implements the clock
announcement, the auctioneer announces the set of continuation and exit actions
to bidder i. Also, the auctioneer reveals the continuation outcomes associated with
each of the continuation action and the exit outcome for each exit action. Because
continuation outcomes are undominated in Xi(Ii) and exit outcomes are weakly un-
dominated in Xi(Ii). Therefore thay are also undominated and weakly undominated
in the announced outocmes Xit, respectively. Because D is regret-proof, and there-
fore OSP, D satisfies the single continuation property. Therefore, the announcement
at Ii satisfies all the requirements that we mentioned in the PED auction rules. Also,
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because D satisfies the strong persistence of exits property, whenever the set of exit
outcomes does not shrink when the clock descends. Also, if the previously chosen
continauation action can achieve more than one continuation outcomes, the auc-
tioneer will have to call him to action again. Also, D is regret-proof and hence
OSP, then D satisfies the single continuation property. The above conditions fully
characterize a PED mechanism.
Let D be a PED mechanism. We prove by induction that the outcomes in XEit
and XCit are indeed exit and continuation outcomes and therefore the annoucement
satisfies the single continuation property and the strong persistence of exits property.
Let t = 0, because there is no forgone outcomes, then being nonassurable and
undominated in Xit is sufficient for an outcome to be an continuation outcome.
Also, being weakly undominted in Xit is sufficient for being an exit outcome. Now
suppose the statement is true for all t′ < t. Now we show it is true for t. Let xi ∈ XCit ,
then by the auction rule it is achievable but unassurable. If it is dominated by some
forgone outcome xgi at some t
′′ < t, then by the single continuation property, the
forgone outcome xgi is an exit outcome at t. By the persistence of exit property,
xgi is also an exit outcome at t and therefore dominates xi. Therefore, the outcome
xi is an continuation outcome. This is a contradiction. Similarly, we can use the
same logic to show that all the outcomes in XEit are weakly undominated in Xit and
in XGi (Ii). Therefore, they are all exit outcomes. Therefore, the PED mechanism
implements explicit exits and the clock announcement. It is also obvious now that
the PED mechanism satisfies the strong persistence of exits property and the single
continuation property. Therefore, by Theorem 9, D is OSP and hence regret-free.
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Combining all the above properties, D is ORP.
Proof of Theorem 8.
Let M = (αN , ρN) be OSP-implementable, then there exists an OSP mech-
anism D such that for all i ∈ N ui ∈ Ui, there exists Si(ui) such that for ui, we
have
1. Si(ui) is obviously dominant for ui,
2. χi(z(h0, SN(uN))) = (αi(uN), ρi(uN)),
where SN(uN) is a short hand notation of (Si(ui))i∈N .
Because D is OSP, it satisfies the Single Continuation Property and the Per-
sistence of Exits Property. To modify D so that it becomes a PED mechanism, we
first need to make it satisfy the Strong Persistence of Exits and then we enforce the
explicit exits. The descending clock announcement only regulates how the auction-
eer reveals informations to bidder, it doesn’t change the extensive form game of D.
Before we start to modify D and the dominant strategy equilibrium, we first define
the following operation on a dynamic game D:
1. Remove direct assignment:
For each i ∈ N , and for each terminal node z ∈ Z, let Ii be the last information
set before z and let ai = Si(Ii) be the action taken to arrive z. If Xi(a) is not
a singleton, then insert a history h right before z with only one action a′ that
reaches z. Call i to play at h, that is ι(h) = i, and add an information set
I ′i = {h} to Ii. Also, set A(I ′i) = {a′}. Iterate this process through all i ∈ N ,
then the new game D′ has no direct assignment.
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2. Remove an action a ∈ A(Ii):
Let H(h) ≡ {h′ ∈ H|h ≺ h′} and H(a) ≡ ∪{H(h)|A(h) = a}. Thus H(a) is
the set of all h′ ∈ H such that h′ is reached only if i chooses action a at Ii.
Remove all H(a).
3. Given a mechanism without direct assignment, remove an outcome xi from
a ∈ A(Ii):
Because xi ∈ Xi(a), there exists z ∈ Z such that h ≺ z for some h ∈ Ii
and χi(z) = xi. Because D has no direct assignment, the last action ā taken
to reach z should have Xi(ā) = {xi}. Then for each such z, there exists an
earliest action a(z) taken by i to reach z such that Xi(a(z)) = {xi}. Then for
all such z remove a(z). Then after the removal, xi /∈ Xi(a).
4. Given a mechanism without direct assignment, if xi is assurable by a but Xi(a)
contians other achievable outcomes, then we can isolate xi as follows:
For each h ∈ Ii, get h′ : A(h′) = a duplicate the entire subgame H(h′) as
H(h′′) such that the precedence structure is isomorphic to H(h′), and h ≺ h′′.
Add a new action a′ to A(Ii) such that a
′ is the action to reach the new h′′ for
each h ∈ Ii. Thus, Xi(a′) = Xi(a). Now remove all outcomes in Xi(a′) other
than xi. Therefore, we now have Xi(a
′) = {xi}.
We say a ∈ A(Ii) is an exit action if Xi(a) does not contain any continuation
outcome.
With the above defined operations, we can modify D and the strategies Si(ui)
as follows:
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1. Remove direct assignment. Then set Si(ui)(I
′
i) = a
′ for all the new information
set and new action, then the allocation rule is not changed at each of the step
in the process. Therefore, D′ still implements M .
2. Remove redundant exit outcomes: for all i ∈ N , and Ii ∈ Ii, if there exists
xi ∈ Xi(Ii) such that xi is assurable by more than one exit actions, then
arbitrarily choose one exit action a that secures xi and remove xi from all
other exit actions. Set for all ui such that Si(ui) secures xi at Ii, change
Si(ui) such that Si(ui) secures xi with a. This will not change the allocation
rule. Because M is monotonic, therefore contingent on i secures xi at Ii, the
contingent allocation for the rest of bidders should be the same for all choices
of i.
3. Isolate exit outcomes: for all i ∈ N , Ii ∈ Ii, and each of the assurable outcomes
xi, isolate xi such that xi is assurable by a dedicated action a such that
Xi(a) = {xi}. Now for other actions a′ such that a′ is not continuation action
and Xi(a
′) is not singleton, remove a′. For all ui such that Si(ui) secures
xi at Ii, modify Si(ui) such that Si(ui) secures xi with the new action a
′
that Xi(a) = {xi}. The modification also doesn’t change the allocation and
payment rules.
4. After the above operations, when i secures xi at Ii with action a ∈ A(Ii), xi is
the only possible outcome. Then if i is called at I ′i after Ii, he only has one sigle
action available a′ ∈ A(I ′i) with Xi(a′) = {xi}. Then for all h′ ∈ I ′i, let h1 be
the immediate predecessor of h′ and h2 be the unique immediate successor of
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h′. We can remove h′ and keep all H(h′) such that h2 becomes the immediate
successor of h1. After removing all such histories, i is not called to play at all
after choosing a. That implies that i becomes inactive and secures xi after the
first time he chooses an exit action.
5. Now we have a mechanism with 1-1 mapping between exit outcomes and exit
actions, and once i secures an exit outcome, he becomes inactive. Now for all
i ∈ N , descending nodes Ii ∈ Ii, if xgi ∈ XGi (Ii) is not assurable at Ii, there
exits a previous information set I ′i and x
g
i is assurable by a
′ at I ′i such that
Xi(a
′) = {xgi }. Now duplicate one of the subgame H(h′) for some A(h′) = a′
and attach to each h ∈ Ii. Modify the strategies Si(ui) for each ui ∈ Ui
such that Si(ui) points to actions that are isomorphic to the original subgame
H(h′). But keep that Si(ui)(Ii) unchanged.
Because D is OSP, if xgi is not assurable at Ii, it means that for all ui ∈ Ui,
xgi is not the fantasy outcome at Ii, therefore, even if x
g
i becomes assurable
at Ii, Si(ui) not choosing to secure it is still obviously dominant. Therefore,
the new subgame will not be visited at all and all of the information sets are
not on the path. Therefore, we don’t need to verify the obviously dominance
condition on those information sets.
Now after these modifications, D now satisfies the strong Persistence of Exits,
and enforces 1-1 mapping between the exit actions and exit outcomes. Now if
the auctioneer implements the descending clock announcement, D becomes a PED
mechanism. In all the above modifications, the allocation and payment rules don’t
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change. Therefore, the new mechanism still implements M . That is, M is PED-
implementable.
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Appendix C: Proofs of Chapter 2
Proof of Theorem 10. (⇒): Suppose M is finite and strategy-proof. First
of all, Yi(u−i) is finite because the entire outcome space χi(Ui) is finite. Second,
given u−i ∈ U−i, the payment ρi(·, u−i) should be constant on Ui(yi, u−i). If not,
then there exists u′i, u
′′
i ∈ Ui(yi, u−i) such that ρi(u′i, u−i) > ρi(u′′i , u−i). Then for
u′′i , deviating to u
′
i is a profitable deviation which violates strategy-proofness. Thus,
we set Pi(yi, u−i) to this constant. Thus, the third condition is met. Finally, we
show that αi(uN) ∈ arg max{ui(y′i, Pi(y′i, u−i))|y′i ∈ Yi(u−i)}. Suppose not, then
there exists y′i ∈ Yi(u−i) such that ui(yi, Pi(y′i, u−i)) > ui(yi, Pi(yi, u−i)). Because
y′i ∈ Yi(u−i), the set Ui(y′i, u−i) 6= ∅. Thus, a deviation to u′i ∈ Ui(y′i, u−i) will
result in an outcome that is strictly better for ui, again violating strategy-proofness.
Therefore, all the three conditions are satisfied.
(⇐): Suppose that M is a pricing mechanism and uN ∈ UN . Suppose
αN(uN) = yN . For any i ∈ N , if bidder i deviates to some reports in Ui(yi, u−i),
then the payment stays the same, therefore it is not a profitable deviation. If he de-
viates to Ui(y
′
i, u−i) for some other y
′
i ∈ Yi(u−i), then by the definition of the pricing
mechanism, we have αi(uN) ∈ arg max{ui(y′i, Pi(y′i, u−i))|y′i ∈ Yi(u−i)}. Thus, this
is not a profitable deviation. Thus, the mechanism is strategy-proof.
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Proof of Lemma 4. The reversed direction should be obvious enough. If the
endowment outcome or something dominates it is always available, then the outcome
cannot be worse than that. We now show the forward direction. Suppose that M
is ex-post IR, and for all xi ∈ Xi(u−i), xi  x0i . Therefore, x0i is undominated in
Xi(u−i). Because M is finite, Xi(u−i) is finite. Then by Lemma 13, there exists
ui ∈ Ui such that ui(x0i ) > ui(x′i) for all x′i ∈ Xi(u−i)\{xi}. Because Xi(u−i) is
the set of possible outcomes. Then the outcome for ui is for sure worse then x
0
i .
Therefore, the mechanism violates ex-post IR. Proof of Theorem 11. Efficiency
is implied by the definition of the allocation rule. It suffices for us to just show
that the mechanism is strategy-proof and ex-post individual rational. For strategy-
proofness, we show that the provided pricing function supports the VCG mechanism.
Let uN ∈ UN , i ∈ N , suppose that αN(uN) = yN
W (yN , uN) ≥ W (y′N , uN) ∀y′N ∈ F (C.1)
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j ) + w(y
′′
N)|y′′i = y′i, y′′N ∈ F} (C.3)
⇒vi(yi) + Vi(yi, u−i) ≥ vi(y′i) + Vi(y′i, u−i) (C.4)
⇒vi(yi) + Vi(yi, u−i)− Vi(y0i , u−i) ≥ vi(y′i) + Vi(y′i, u−i)− Vi(y0i , u−i) (C.5)
⇒vi(yi) + Pi(yi, u−i) ≥ vi(y′i) + Pi(y′i, u−i) (C.6)
Thus, M is supported by the pricing function PN . Therefore, by Theorem 10, M is
strategy-proof.
In Equation C.5, plug y′i = y
0
i , then we have vi(αi(uN)) + ρi(uN) ≥ 0 for all
uN ∈ UN . Therefore, M is ex-post individual rational.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let Ūi(xi, ui) ≡ {x′i ∈ Xi|ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi)}. Since ui ≥yi u′i,
there exists xi = (yi, pi) ∈ Xi such that ui ≥xi u′i. Let y′i ∈ Yi, and x′i = (y′i, vi(yi)−
vi(y
′
i) + pi) ∈ Xi, then ui(x′i) = vi(y′i) + [vi(yi) − vi(y′i) + pi] = vi(yi) + pi = ui(xi).
Thus, x′i ∈ Ūi(xi, ui). Because ui ≥xi u′i, Ūi(xi, ui) ⊆ Ūi(xi, u′i) and x′i ∈ Ūi(xi, u′i).
Therefore, v′i(y
′
i) + [vi(yi) − vi(y′i) + pi] ≥ v′i(yi) + pi, and finally vi(yi) − vi(y′i) ≥
v′i(yi)− v′i(y′i).
Proof of Theorem 12. Let y′N ∈ α∗N(yi, u−i), u′−i ∈ U−i such that u′j ≥y′j uj for
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j)− vj(y′′j )]− [v′i(y′i)− v′i(y′′i )] + [v′i(y′i)− v′i(y′′i )]
]
+ w(y′N)− w(y′′N) ≥ 0
(C.9)
Because u′j ≥y′j uj, by Lemma 6, [vj(y
′



















j ) + w(y
′′
N) (C.11)
⇒y′N ∈ α∗N(yi, u′−i) (C.12)
Now suppose the pricing decreases. That is, Pi(yi, u
′
−i) < Pi(yi, u−i). Suppose
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y1N ∈ α∗N(y0i , u−i) and y2N ∈ α∗N(yi, u′−i). Then
∑
j 6=i














[v′j(yj)− v′j(y2j )− vj(yj) + vj(y2j )− vj(y2j ) + vj(y1j )]− w(y2N) + w(y1N) < 0
(C.16)

















i ) + w(y
1
N) (C.18)
The last equation contradicts with that y1N ∈ α∗N(y0i , u−i). Hence, we reject the
assumption that the pricing decreases and complete the proof of the first claim.
The proof of the second claim uses the same technique as the first one. We leave it
for the readers to verify.
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose the claim is not true. That is, there exists xei ∈
x∗i (τi, u
′
i) ∩ XEi . Then we have u′i(xei ) ≥ u′i(xi), which implies u′i(xei ) ∈ Ūi(xi, u′i) ⊆
Ūi(xi, ui). Thus, ui(x
e
i ) ≥ ui(xi) and xei ∈ x∗i (τi, ui). This contradicts that ui ∈ Ui(τi)
and completes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 8. Let τi = (ait, X
E
it ). Let ui ∈ U ′i , because Si is a cautiously
optimistic strategy, x∗i (τ, ui) ∩XEit = ∅. Also, because the PED mechanism is OSP,
by the Single Continuation Property, x∗i (τ, ui) ⊆ ait. Therefore, ui ∈ Ui(τi) and
therefore U ′i ⊆ Ui(τi).
Let ui ∈ Ui(τi). Let Iit denote the information set at period t. Then by the
descending property of the PED mechanism, for all xi ∈ ait and ait′ ∈ ψi(Ii), there
exists x′i ∈ ait′ such that x′i ≥ xi. Also, by the strong Persistent of Exit property,
Xit′ ⊆ Xit for all Iit′ ∈ ψi(Iit). Therefore, the most preferred outcome at Iit′ should
also be in ait′ . Thus, the cautiously optimistic strategy for ui should choose ait′
at all information set Iit′ . Therefore, ui reaches Iit and thus ui ∈ U ′i . Therefore,
Ui(τi) ⊆ U ′i and the two sets are equal.
Proof of Lemma 9. Suppose the claim is not true. Then there exists ui ∈ Ui(τ)
such that ui /∈ Ui(τ̂). Then there exists xei ∈ x∗i (τ̂i, ui) ∩ X̂Ei . Also, because ui ∈
Ui(τi), there exists xci ∈ x∗i (τ, ui) ∩XCi such that ui(xci) > ui(xei ). Then there exists
x̂ci ∈ X̂Ci such that x̂ci ≥ xci . Therefore, ui(x̂ci) ≥ ui(xci) > ui(xei ). This contradicts
that ui(x
e
i ) ∈ x∗i (τ̂i, ui) and completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 13. We first construct X̄i(uN) for all i ∈ N and UN(xN , uN)
for all xi ∈ X̄i(uN).
For i ∈ N , let Y Mi = αi(UN) and for each yi ∈ Y Mi , define p̄i(yi) = sup{ρi(uN)|uN ∈
UN , αi(uN) = yi}. Let X0i = {(yi, p̄(yi))|yi ∈ Y Mi }. Let τ 0i = (X0i , {x0i }). Thus, X0i
is the set of best possible outcomes that i could achieve in mechanism M . τ 0i defines
a initial threshold of bidder i.
Because M is PED-implementable, let uN ∈ UN , then there exists cautiously
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optimistic strategy Si for ui for i ∈ N . With SN , the path of play in D is fixed.
Now suppose all bidders play according to SN . Let A(t) be the set of active bidders
at each period t.
Let Ti be the last period i is called to action, which is also the period when
he chooses to exit. Let X̄i(uN) = X
E
iTi
. Given i ∈ N and xi ∈ X̄i(uN), let t(xi) be
the time period when xi is first added to Eit.
For all j ∈ A(t(xi)), if j has never been called to action before t(xi), set
τj(xi) = τ
0
j ; else, set tj to be the last period that bidder j 6= i is called to action
before t(xi). Because j is active, Sj must have chosen a continuation action a
c
j ∈ XCjtj






Let UN(xN , uN) = UN(uN , (τj(xi))j∈A(t(xi))). By construction, UN(xN , uN) is a
threshold space. Now we show the claimed results.
1. χi(uN) ∈ X̄i(uN): Because i chooses to exit at Ti, then χi(uN) ∈ XEiTi =
X̄i(uN).
2. We order ∪i∈NX̄i(uN) by the time they are first added to the exit outcome.
That is, t(x(1)) ≤ t(x(2)) ≤ · · · ≤ t(x(k)). The evolution rule of the PED
mechanism guarantees that if t(x) ≥ t(x′), then A(t(x)) ⊆ A(t(x′)), and for
all j ∈ A(t(x)), τj(x) ≤ τj(x′). Therefore, UN(uN , x) ⊆ UN(uN , x′).
3. By Lemma 8, the set Uj(τj(xi)) is the set of uj that are still active when
xi = (yi, pi) becomes an exit outcome. Because once xi becomes the exit
outcome, it will be persistent throughout the rest of the mechanism, therefore,
any report in Uj(τj(xi)) will not affect the pricing of yi. Thus, the product
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threshold space UN(uN , (τj(xi))j∈A(t(xi))) is a constant pricing space for xi.
4. For condition 3a: because XEjtj is the set of exit outcomes at period tj, there-
fore, for each xj ∈ XEjtj , there exists t(xj) ≤ tj < t(xi) when it becomes the
exit outcome. That implies that xj ∈ X̄j(uN) and xj precedes xi in the hi-
erarchy. Conversely, if xj precedes xi in the hierarchy, then it means that in
the last period tj when j is called to play before t(xi), xj ∈ XEjtj . Therefore,
xj ∈ XEj .
5. For condition 3b: if xj ∈ Xj(u−j)\XEj , than it means xj has not been an-
nounced as an exit outcome at tj. Therefore, all the uj that will eventually
be assigned xj will have to choose to continue at tj. Thus, the continuation
action uj choses should contain some x
′
j ≥ xj. Therefore, x′j ∈ acj = XCj .
6. For condition 3c, if j /∈ A(t(xi)), then it means that j has chosen some exit
outcome. The outcome he chooses should be xj = χj(uN). Then xj must
have become an exit outcome before t(xi). Therefore, there exists a constant
pricing space that precedes xi in the hierarchy.
Proof of Theorem 14. Suppose that yi has winner influence over yj for all j ∈ S,
j 6= i. As we did in the proof of Theorem 13, let t(xi) be the period when xi becomes
the exit outcome, and define τj(xi) as the announcements for j chooses to continue
in the last period before t(xi).
Let uN ∈ UN(yS, uN\S). Then for all j ∈ S, we have αj(uN) = yj. Because
for all period t′ < t, xi is not available to exit, therefore, for all u
′
i ∈ Ui(yi, u−i),
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the cautiously optimistic strategy has to continue and therefore must be the same.
That implies that if yj becomes an exit allocation before t(xi), then it is not possible
for the pricing of yj to be influenced by the reports in Ui(yi, u−i). Hence, yj is a
continuation action in the last period before t(xi). Therefore, uj ∈ Uj(τj(xi)).
Therefore, uN ∈ UN(uN , xi) and US(yS, uN\S) ⊆ UN(uN , xi).
137
Bibliography
Bade, Sophie and Yannai A. Gonczarowski (2017) “Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success
Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness,” Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference
on Economics and Computation, 10.1145/3033274.3085104.
Brooks, Leah and Byron Lutz (2016) “From Today’s City to Tomorrow’s City: An
Empirical Investigation of Urban Land Assembly,” American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 8 (3), 69–105.
Clarke, Edward H (1971) “Multipart pricing of public goods,” Public Choice, 17–33.
Groves, Theodore (1973) “Incentives in Teams,” Econometrica, 41 (4), 617–631.
Kominers, Scott Duke and E Glen Weyl (2012a) “Concordance among Holdouts,”
Working Paper.
Kominers, Scott Duke and E. Glen Weyl (2012b) “Holdout in the Assembly of
Complements: A Problem for Market Design,” American Economic Review, 102
(3), 360–65, 10.1257/aer.102.3.360.
Li, Shengwu (2017) “Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,” American Economic
Review, 107 (11), 3257–3287.
Mailath, George J and Andrew Postlewaite (1990) “Asymmetric Information Bar-
gaining Problems with Many Agents,” Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), 351–
367.
Menezes, Flavio and Rohan Pitchford (2004) “A Model of Seller Holdout,” Economic
Theory, 24 (2), 231–253.
Miceli, Thomas J and Kathleen Segerson (2012) “Land Assembly and the Holdout
Problem Under Sequential Bargaining,” American Law and Economics Review,
14 (2), 372–390.
Milgrom, Paul and Ilya Segal (2020) “Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallo-
cation,” Journal of Political Economy, 128 (1), 1–31.
138
Plassmann, Florenz and T. Nicolaus Tideman (2007) “Efficient Urban Renewal
Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem,” Working Pa-
per.
(2010) “Providing incentives for efficient land assembly,” Working Paper.
Rees-Jones, Alex (2018) “Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evi-
dence from the residency match,” Games and Economic Behavior, 108, 317–330.
Vickrey, William (1961) “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed
Tenders,” The Journal of Finance, 16 (1), 8–37.
139
